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ABSTRACT 
Port Management Information Systems (Port MIS) are systems that support port 
managers in the facilitation of port activities. However, little is known about the system 
and the risk that it presents. Much information is exposed, and security needs to be 
strengthened. Port MIS helps managers to make decisions relating to the activities 
that enable effective management and leadership of the port. Inadequate and poor 
risk management would lead to loss of business and potential loss of human life. This 
research study focused on the subsystems that make up Port MIS. There is limited 
research on port management, and more specifically the risks involved in such 
national assets. The study explored the purpose of such systems and how they 
contribute to the whole system. The findings and recommendations would benefit port 
managers both nationally and internationally as globalisation becomes the basis of 
world trade and economies.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The sea has always been a major means of trade between countries, resulting in the 
establishment of ports all over the world. Ports are important in the facilitation of the 
importing and exporting of goods to and from a country, and South Africa (SA) is no 
exception. This can been seen by the number of ports that SA has across the coastline 
of the country. Transnet (Pty) LTD, a parastatal of the government of South Africa, 
operates eight commercial ports. The South African ports are not very different to any 
developed country’s ports, since they also utilise information systems. Information 
systems, such as the Port Management Information System, help to ensure effective 
communication to avoid time being wasted (Abbes, 2015). 
 
Port Managers use the port Management Information Systems for communication and 
to avoid wasting time using manual procedures. The literature review conducted 
revealed that Management Information Systems (MIS) have no single theoretical 
background, similar to that of the Port Management Information Systems (Port MIS) 
which also does not have any notable definition. These terms refer to a broad class of 
conceptual frameworks that have been developed to understand and explain the 
design, use, administration and concerns of information systems  for management use 
(Majchrzak and Markus, n.d.). There are, however, risks to blindly relying on such 
systems and if they are not continuously monitored and assessed, they have the 
potential to cause much damage.  
 
A seaport, traditionally a place of articulation among transportation systems, is 
logically a place for the convergence of numerous information flows, all of which are 
contained within the Port Management Information Systems. In addition to the 
requirement for security and speed; reliability on delivery time and frequency of service 
are of fundamental importance to all port users. This becomes an obligation that 
management needs to provide (Abbes, 2015).The Port MIS needs to have security 
features that include management of risk,  amongst other aspects. This is critical as it 
has such a high volume of information that flows through it, making it vulnerable to 
exposure and negative interference.  
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Chapter One of this study on the Port MIS provides the problem statement that forms 
the crux of the investigation. The research objectives follow, addressing the purpose 
of the study. These objectives are rephrased into questions which interrogate the 
research problem. More light is shed on the research objectives through the research 
methodology, and through an overview of how the literature review was conducted. A  
glossary of terms is also provided to give perspective on the terms used in this treatise. 
Chapter One closes with an outline of forthcoming chapters and an overview of the 
content presented.  
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Port MIS are associated with Management Information Systems. They are used 
specifically at sea ports for the purpose of supporting management. Management 
Information Systems are computer information systems that collect and process 
information from different sources in an organization, assisting management at all 
decision-making levels (Al-mamary, Shamsuddin & Aziati, 2014).  
 
The Port MIS helps the managers of a port to make informed decisions by collecting 
information from different levels of the organisation. The Port MIS provides 
management with an opportunity to evaluate their vulnerability to risk, thus assisting  
management with their decision-making (Kumar & Singh, 2015). Security was 
identified as a concern because of inflow of information from many sources. The result 
is that port terminals have an increasing dependency upon technology, and 
automation has clearly brought considerable economic benefit. However, this 
dependency also introduces vulnerability. Any loss of availability, integrity and 
confidentiality related to critical systems or data has the potential to cause significant 
business disruption, with consequent financial loss. As the sophistication of malignant 
targeted attacks increase, so must efforts to contain and respond to the threat (Marsh, 
2014). 
 
The above threats to MIS confirm the need to have all risks and vulnerabilities 
managed. This applies to the operations of a port and its systems as well. A proposed 
solution is Risk Management, which is defined as the process of identifying and 
assessing risk, and to apply methods to reduce risk to an acceptable extent  (Serpella, 
Ferrada, Howard & Rubio, 2014). Thus, in order to have the port activities operational 
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despite the prevalent potential risks, the Risk Management of Port Management 
Information Systems should be investigated and updated on a regular basis. Such 
Risk Management is the focus of this study.  
 
The research problem stated is explored by seeking answers to a set of research 
questions. 
1.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The above-mentioned problem statement led to the following research questions: 
RQ1: What are the risks that apply to information systems such as the Port MIS? 
RQ2: What are prevalent risk assessment methods? 
RQ3: What are the effects of risk on Port MIS and subsystems? 
RQ 4: What is the importance of risk assessment? 
RQ5: What is the importance of risk management? 
RQ6: Do all eight ports in South Africa attach the same level of importance to risk 
assessment for their Port MIS? 
RQ 7: How can a risk management strategy be standardised for all eight ports? 
 
1.4 THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The primary objective of this study is to explore the effect of managing risk within Port 
Management Information Systems.   
The secondary research objectives for this study follow: 
RO1: To understand the role of Port MIS and subsystems, and the risks they face. 
RO2: To investigate risk assessment methods. 
RO3: To determine the effects of risk prevalent within information systems such as 
 the Port MIS.  
RO4: To investigate the importance of risk assessment methods.  
RO5: To explain the importance of Risk Management Systems such as the Port MIS.  
RO6: To conduct a survey to evaluate how port users perceive risk management.  
RO7: To determine the standardisation of a Risk Management Strategy for Port MIS   
 that would be applicable to all eight ports. 
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1.5 THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY  
 
To achieve the above-mentioned primary objective, the following methodology was 
used: 
  (i)  An extensive literature review was conducted on risk management  
  strategies, Port Management Information Systems and the risks  
  prevalent to such information systems. 
 (ii) A questionnaire (see Appendix B) was developed to measure the above-
  mentioned variables. 
 (iii) The questionnaire was emailed to personnel who use Port MIS across 
  the ports of South Africa. 
  (v)   The responses from the sample group were recorded and the empirical 
  results analysed. 
 (vi)  Based on the results, conclusions were drawn; recommendations for 
  port managers suggested and gaps for future research identified.  
 
1.5.1 The research study approach   
 
The study was conducted using a mix of both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies. The qualitative study included the literature review on both Risk 
Management and Port MIS. The review covered the use Port Management Information 
Systems and subsystems and their associated risks. The review also included the role 
played by Port MIS in supporting the management team in their decision making. The 
study investigated the benefits of Risk Management methods on Port MIS. The 
quantitative study included the questionnaire sent to the respondents on how they 
managed risks relating to Port MIS.  
1.5.2 Sampling design  
 
This study focused on Transnet Port Management information system end users. The 
users included lower to mid-level managers who interact with Transnet’s Port 
Management Information System. A sample of at most 30 users around the country 
were targeted by the questionnaire, which was sent internally to Transnet (Pty) Ltd 
Respondents had to reply via an e-mailed link. They had to complete the online 
questionnaire and their responses were automatically recorded.  
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1.5.3 The measuring instrument  
 
The questions on the questionnaires were measured against the Likert Scale, where 
the respondents had to give a response ranging from “Strongly disagree to Strongly 
agree” on statements which probed the research questions.  
1.5.4 Data analysis 
 
The data collated from the respondents was summarised and analysed using 
descriptive statistical methods to find the most common responses to the research 
questions. Further analysis was done to find relationships within the findings that 
helped to better understand the research objectives.  
1.5.5 Ethics clearance  
The completed Ethics Clearance form was submitted to the Nelson Mandela University 
Business School for their approval. The group of respondents did not qualify as a 
vulnerable group, such as schoolchildren, thus a full ethics clearance did not apply. 
The approved Form E is attached as Appendix A.  
1.6 TERMINOLOGY/ ACRONYMS  
 
IT Information Technology 
AIS Automatic Identification System  
DOS Denial of Service  
DR Disaster Recovery 
FM Facilities Management 
FPIC Fixed Priced Incentive Contracts 
GAM Guaranteed Annual Minimum   
ICT  Information Communication Technology  
IP  Intellectual Property 
IS  Information Systems 
ISMS Integrated Ship Management Systems. 
MIS Management Information Systems 
NRTSAPD  
 
Near Real Time Statistical Asset Priority 
Driven   
Port 
MIS/PMIS Port Management Information Systems 
VBS Vehicle Booking System 
VPIC Variable Priced Incentive Contracts 
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1.7 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY  
 
Chapter 1 
 
Chapter 1 presents a brief outline of the study. The management question or 
problem, and the basic research methodology are reviewed. The study approach, 
which includes both qualitative and quantitative methods, was also introduced. 
 
Chapter 2  
 
Chapter 2 includes the literature review on risk management of information 
systems, such as Port Management Information Systems. An in-depth review of 
available research studies was done on the benefits of understating risk to 
Information Systems like the Port Management Information Systems. The focus 
was on their impact on systems and how they should be addressed as a 
management problem.  
 
Chapter 3  
Chapter 3 focused on subsystems that make up the Port MIS as a system. Each 
subsystem was independently reviewed to identify what it contributed to the overall 
system.   
 
Chapter 4  
Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology and approach adopted for this 
study. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 presents the data analysis that was conducted to address the research 
questions. Statistical methods were applied to the data collected from the 
respondents to see if there was any correlation between the research objectives 
and the findings.  
 
Chapter 6  
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Chapter 6 is a summary of the study and presents an overview of the management 
question, literature review, research methodology and the data analysis. The 
management question is addressed and recommendations are made. The future 
prospects of research gaps are identified and discussed. 
 
1.8 SUMMARY 
  
Chapter 1 identified the concepts of Port MIS and the risks prevalent to such systems. 
The secondary research questions and objectives related to the primary research 
purpose, questions and objectives were provided. The methodology was clarified, and 
the qualitative and quantitative nature of the study. Chapter outlines followed, giving a 
holistic perspective of the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PORT MIS RISK MANAGEMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In every country that has a coastline, there is always a port or ports for the import and 
export of goods. The port will have managers using information systems to support its 
operations. This study is about the management information systems that support the 
operations of the port. However, management information systems as part of 
organisations pose risks that have to be managed.  
 
Risk Management of Port Management Information Systems (Port-MIS) is the focus 
of this study. Port-MIS and what it is used for are briefly discussed. Common risks in 
information systems such as Port-MIS are explored, as well as how the risks should 
be assessed and how to identify the types of risks that exist. The study goes on to 
identify different types of risk assessment methods that are predominantly used on 
information systems such as Port- MIS.  The chapter closes with a summary of the 
benefits of Risk Management for Port-MIS.  
2.2 OVERVIEW OF PORT-MIS 
 
Management Information Systems (MIS) is a term used to describe a specific category 
of information system that serves middle management. The systems serve to give 
middle managers knowledge of the operations of the business (Laudon & Laudon, 
2010). Port Management Information Systems (Port-MIS) is a kind of management 
support information system that helps with the arrival/departure processes of ships  
(Park et al., 2005). Čišić & Tijan (2011) see it as a system that the Port Authority needs 
in its operations. It provides information that allows for the supervision of the overall 
activities of the seaport, enabling managers to make well-timed and accurate 
decisions (Čišić & Tijan, 2011). 
Port MIS is defined as an “electronic system that handles administrative procedures 
of vessel and cargo movements,  inside the port ” (Keceli, Choi, Cha, Aydogdu & Kim, 
2008). The computerised system has five major modules, namely Cargo Control, 
Vessel Control, Port Facilities, Billing and Statistics as depicted in Figure 2.1 below.  
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Figure 2.1: Port MIS overview 
Source: (Keceli et al., 2008:167) 
 
From the definition, it is evident that a Port MIS is a critical system to the operations 
of the port, and thus risk associated with it must be managed. It is also critical in 
supporting the operations performed by managers. It provides the statistical activities 
about the operations at the port. Port MIS has cargo registration details, as well as 
information of the cargo being carried by the vessels. This information needs to be 
protected from risks. Port-MIS has therefore to have risks assessed and managed in 
case of risks that might threaten it. Managers have to ensure that their division has 
effective processes in place to handle the risks.  
The literature review exposed that organisations allocate a larger budget for 
Information Technology (IT) security because of the greater threat posed by IT. This 
confirms the importance of Port-MIS risk management, and why the active practice of 
risk management methods would aid port managers to classify the controls desirable 
to conserve IT to counter risk (Tohidi, 2011). Risk management is clearly critical, 
hence the huge funds that are allocated to them.   
The nature of risk need to be understood, what forms they come in and how they 
endanger Port-MIS. The next section discusses these factors. 
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2.3 THE NATURE OF RISK 
 
In order to discuss the nature of risk, one has to first understand what risk is. According 
to the Oxford dictionary, risk is defined as: “A person or thing regarded as a threat or 
likely source of danger” (Oxford University, 2016b). Wiesche et al., (2013)  defined risk 
in information systems, which would include Port MIS, as “any threat that may lead to 
the improper modification, destruction, theft, or lack of availability of IT assets” 
(Wiesche, Keskinov, Scherman, & Kremar, 2013). The definitions show that risks are 
threats that lead to undesirable consequences, such as danger to and destruction of 
the assets of an organisation.  
Risks are known to be internal or external. Internal risks are known as Endogenous 
Risk. External risks are known as Exogenous Risk. Their nature is classed into these 
two categories.  
 
Exogenous Risks refers to those risks that an organisation has no hold over and are 
not caused by activities within an organisation. Unanticipated tragedies such as floods 
and earthquakes are Exogenous risks (Chou & Chou, 2009). Nehari–Talet et.al. 
(2014) saw Exogenous Risks as those over which organisations have no control, and 
which are not a result of internal activities. Hurricanes and earthquakes are worthy 
examples of Exogenous Risk. While there is approximate control on the amount of 
damage these examples can cause by choosing specific construction standards, there 
is actually no control over the existence of such unexpected events (Nehari Talet, Mat-
Zin, & Houari, 2014).  
 
Endogenous Risk arises from within the organisation. An example would be  
unanticipated resistance by users, vagueness concerning the cost of workers’ 
turnover, the risk of commitment escalation and repair costs in the long execution 
process (Rajnoha, Kádárová, Sujová, & Kádár, 2014). Chou and Chou extend on the 
same explanation of Endogenous Risks, by saying they refer to those risks that are 
reliant on actions inside the organisation. They are also risks that enter an organisation 
through outsource contracting. Outsource contracting also falls under Endogenous 
Risk (Chou & Chou, 2009). 
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The distinction found between the two natures of risk was that Exogenous Risk are 
risks from natural causes; the organisation expects them but has no control over when 
and how they would happen. Endogenous Risk comes from within the organisation; 
they result from association and processes inside the organisation, including 
outsourcing. The above risks are likely to happen on the Port MIS, hence the 
justification for this study. The next section discusses the risks in Port MIS. 
 
2.4 RISKS IN PORT MIS 
 
Port MIS is a management information system, as already defined. A Management 
Information System (MIS) is described as an information system used in management 
and business (Kitagaki & Hikita, 2007). MIS on its own is an information system built 
specifically for business and management. 
 
Information systems are made up of many components.  Figure 2.2 discusses the 
components of the information system.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Components of an Information System (IS)  
Source: (Oz, 2009:15) 
 
The Port-MIS as an information system has data, hardware, software, 
telecommunications, people and procedures as explained above. The above 
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components of the system are at risk of threats, as is the system itself. It is thus 
essential to identify all potential threats to an organisation that uses Port-MIS. 
 
Threats to Port-MIS may originate within and are termed Insider Threats. Insider 
Threats are individuals or people who have access to the system, or who used to have 
access to the system, and their purpose is to cause harm to the organisation (Bertino, 
2012). Such threats to Port MIS are risks that needs to be managed. Threats to assets 
exist within, and yet can come from external sources at times. This motivates 
organisations to install innovative software systems and hardware for guarding against 
possible attack from outsiders and insiders.  
 
Organisations form numerous information security policies and procedures to help 
against risks. These policies help to decrease and prevent planned or unintentional 
actions of staffs that could either deteriorate the efficiency of the hardware and/ or 
software protection systems that could reduce their usefulness (Hu, Dinev, Hart & 
Cooke, 2012). 
 
IT threats on the information technology assets of an organisation are clearly a valid 
concern. However, in the study of IT, risk addresses different matters when extended 
to software projects, IT security, outsourcing of information systems, e-commerce and 
inter-organisational systems, to mention a few other components of IS  (Wiesche et 
al., 2013). This means that risks within information systems are broad, and not limited 
to a specific type of system. The only typical form of system deployment (as 
outsourcing) has already been mentioned. This study looks into the Risk Management 
of Port MIS, whether it is outsourced systems or an inter-organisational system.  
 
According to Sherer (2004), there are different types of risks from an information 
systems technology perspective. He outlines the different risks as follows:  
 Technical risks that have to do with information systems. 
 Project risks that are relevant to the development of the system. 
 Organisational/ Political risks that have to do with the organisational structure 
or politics. 
 Financial risks. 
 Systematic disaster risks (Sherer, 2004). 
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The malicious damage caused by people from within differs from the individuals that 
have access to the system. The Insider Threats differentiation is outlined in Table 2.1 
below, which illustrates how to identify each threat. 
 
 
Table 2.1 : Insider Threats Scenario 
(Senator et al., 2013:3 ) & (Goldberg, Young, Reardon, Phillips, & Senator, 2017:2650) 
 
A ‘Saboteur’ is an individual or group who is likely to cause interruptions on the shared 
resources of a computer network (Samson, 2015). The distinguishing indicators are 
anomalies such as URL, file and logon, along with file accesses with relation to peers 
(Senator et al., 2013). 
 
A ‘Fraudster’ is an individual inside the organisation who uses IT for personal gain or 
to compel criminality. Fraudsters are not the only threat, because there are also 
thieves. Within the arcade of thieves would be an Ambitious Leader and an entitled 
thief: The Ambitious Leader would be responsible for organising other insiders to get 
admission to all parts of the Intellectual Property (IP) being embezzled. They are also 
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a cause of great loss, based on how much proper planning goes into their actions.  
Their actions are usually for the following reasons:  
 • 43% of the time it is for the creation of a new organisation.  
 • 43 % of the time it is for liaising with a rival business. 
  (Moore et al., 2011) 
 
The thieves are a threat because of what they could do with the Intellectual Property 
(IP) that they steal. This could mean that an organisation has to be very careful with 
their IP. Users of the organisation’s IT resources have to be as careful. Careless users 
could lead to the loss of IP if there are thieves amongst them, or if a thief is intent on 
stealing IP. The careless user is an insider who is not knowingly deceitful, but is an 
individual who disregards corporate IT policies, thus exposing the business to risk.  
 
A ‘Rager’ is an insider who has outbreaks of robust or threatening language usage in 
mail/Webmail/IM when corresponding with anomalies in other activities, indicating a 
potential fundamental change in behaviour. A particular detector specification is found 
in the emails as an indicator of such behaviour (Nehari Talet et al., 2014). The above 
threats are different type of IS threats that can arise from its components.  
 
Telecommunication threats are those made to the infrastructure that is used to 
communicate within the port and Port-MIS infrastructure. The threats come in the form 
of terror attacks, technological threats, criminal attacks and general threats (Agubor 
and Chukwudebe, 2015). 
 
  
Figure 2.3 : Telecommunication threats /attacks   
(Agubor & Chukwudebe, 2015:125) 
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The above Figure 2.3 are attacks that would likely be on the Telecommunication 
system of the Port MIS.   
 
‘Terror attacks’ are broad in scope, and could be understood to be an act of war. The 
definition of terror attacks relating to IS  are best described  as the intention to conduct 
the act and to influence or intimidate the government or population; having some form 
of political, religious or ideological motive or purpose, and the cause of harm, death or 
bodily injury (Al Mazari, Anjariny, Habib, & Nyakwende, 2016). 
 
‘Technological attacks’ are focused on the user’s computer or internet connection by 
someone other than the person using the computer. They are focused on pharming, 
with the intent being to attack system reconfigurations (Chaudhry, Chaudhry & 
Rittenhouse, 2016). Telecommunication systems face such risks and the ideal would 
be to change the systems’ configuration.  
 
‘Criminal Attacks’ are best described as a cyber-crime that is not carried out for a 
political or national security purpose, such as most instances of internet fraud, identity 
theft and intellectual property piracy (Hathaway et al., 2012). 
 
‘General threats’ are attacks on routing protocols which include replaying, spoofing or 
altering routing traffic (Raymond & Midkiff, 2008). Changing traffic of the intended data 
could be a means of depriving the original receiver of the message intended for them. 
These are threats that pose a risk to an Information System (IS) like the Port-MIS. 
These can go undetected unless mechanisms are put in place to detect the threats. 
 
Different techniques can be used to detect threats. Table 2.2 has  a summary of the 
different approaches to detect threats on the Port MIS system. Each approach has its 
own pros and cons. The summary includes which approaches should be used to 
detect threats to Port MIS.  
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Table 2.2 : Threat Detection Approaches 
Source: (Zeadally, Yu, Jeong, & Liang, 2012:8) 
 
The above assumes a system within the organisation. It does not include the system 
within the other company’s premises. The next section discusses the system at the 
other company. This leads to the risk of outsourcing of the Port MIS. 
 
2.5 RISK OF OUTSOURCING PORT MIS  
 
Outsourcing of information systems has experienced considerable growth in recent 
years as it has become an elementary strategy of the IS field. Analysts foresee that 
outsourcing will be ongoing, as the motive for outsourcing is that an organisation 
partners with another strategic organisation that can provide them with IT systems to 
help their business. They then offer them incentives for taking the risks (Gonzalez, 
Gasco & Llopis, 2006).  
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It is likely that an information system like the Port-MIS would be outsourced to another 
company. Both organisations would form strategic partners who would be 
compensated for their purpose and role.  
 
The outsourcing company can offer two key categories of incentive contracts to 
another establishment or business. The contracts offered by the outsourcer are found 
to be no changing  Fixed Price Incentive Contracts (FPIC) and changing Variable Price 
Incentive Contracts (VPIC), (Chou & Chou, 2009). In an FPIC, a pre-arranged price is 
rewarded to the service provider, who takes on responsibility for all the potential cost 
overruns. A service provider can participate in opportunistic bargaining. This means 
that it may burden the customer to recompense the overruns if they hold the unique 
advantage of being the only service provider, and when the option of switching is not 
possible (Zhang & Xu, 2017). 
 
An FPIC is a kind of contract where the charges for information handling are definite, 
but the information processing costs remain inexact (Osei-Bryson & Ngwenyama, 
2006).The contracts both have an enticement and a penalty endowment. The 
contracts may vary in management of the risks if the vendor under-performs. It should 
be noted that this is in itself a risk that an organisation takes when it underperforms 
(Chou & Chou, 2009). Information systems, such as the Port-MIS, are open to risk and 
ambiguity when they outsource their projects, which limits the gamble of outsourcing 
becoming a success. This is in addition to service and management related risk 
matters (Osei-Bryson & Ngwenyama, 2006). 
 
Significant loss of control over the performance of activities by an organisation is 
another result of it contracting out its information processing operations. There are two 
basic risks associated with this loss of control: these are known as shirking and 
opportunistic bargaining. A deliberate underperformance while claiming full payment 
is known to be ‘Shirking’, and comes in a variety of forms. In essence, it involves a 
vendor or an agent doing less work than mandatory, less work than contracted for, 
and less work than compensated for. Shirking refers to the agent's commitment to 
work hard, which would not be the same as the client’s. The absence of information 
available to the outsourcer makes it challenging or difficult to ascertain shirking (Aron, 
Clemons, & Reddi, 2005). 
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Opportunistic bargaining refers to a merchant’s capability to ask for higher than market 
prices. Exposure to opportunistic bargaining is when an outsourcer is tied-into a 
vendor inclusively, and would have to pay substantial charges to change to an 
alternative. To minimise shirking risks, the outsourcer can participate in checking and 
managing mechanisms. The two are accomplished by outsourcers setting up a unit 
within the organisation that manages the relations concerning the vendor and end-
users.  This is done to observe the vendors’ performance and manage the risks of the 
outsourced project (Osei-Bryson & Ngwenyama, 2006). 
The next section discusses how risks are assessed. 
 
2.6 RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
Risk analysis methods can be quantitative or qualitative. Quantitative risk analysis 
methods analyse risk using mathematical and statistical tools (Alberts & Stevens, 
2003; Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005). According to Karacback & Sogukpinar, 
quantitative measures as a method of risk analysis are not appropriate for current 
information security risk analysis. Compared to the past, current information systems 
have a more complex structure. Compound scenarios are difficult to solve, and the 
calculations that come as a result of this are complex (Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 
2005).  
 
Qualitative risk assessment methods are based on decision, instinct and the 
knowledge of the assessor. The use  of assessments by assigning  the likelihoods and 
consequences of risk are more flexible when dealing with diverse situations of risk (Lo 
& Chen, 2012). The risk analysis methods could be computer or paper based 
(Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2005). 
 
Alberts & Stevens (2003) suggest that an organisation should comprehend and protect 
its information security needs by applying a risk analysis method called OCTAVE. 
OCTAVE is labelled as a risk based strategic assessment and planning technique for 
security that is self-directed. This means that within the organisation there should be 
an initiative to set its security strategy (Alberts & Stevens, 2003) .  
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The OCTAVE method is different from other approaches, as depicted in the Table 2.3 
below. It is an analysis approach that looks at the organisation’s risk analysis from 
within the organisation.  
 
 
Table 2.3 : Octave vs Other Approaches 
(Alberts & Stevens, 2003:4) 
 
The Near Real Time Statistical Asset Priority Driven (NRTSAPD) Risk Assessment 
method explores risk analysis over a period. The method considers critical elements 
when assessing the risks of the information system. The method is valued because it 
offers an advantage over other risk assessments in that it gives management a quick, 
easy to use and simple risk assessment methodology. It is  based on an organisational 
mission critical asset priority (Pak, 2008).   
The NRTSAPD as a quantitative method works through various elements in relation 
to risks. It gives them weights to determine the level of risk that the organisation is 
exposed to, and views their impact on the overall risk assessment calculation 
outcome. The calculation has the elements presented below. 
 
Pak (2008) focuses on the following elements in his calculations:  
1. Frequency of the Attacks – This element accounts for 10% and is the most 
critical. It accounts for the number of attacks that were made on the system.  
2. Probability of being attacked again - This element accounts also for 10%. An 
assessor can give a score founded on the present environmental situations and 
how likely a threat would be repeated within an organisation. 
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3. Total Replacement Value - The monetary value element refers to the amount 
of harm a threat could do to the information system of an organisation. The 
factor weighs 20% of the assessment calculation.  
4. Exposure Rating - The element of the assessment calculation has a risk factor 
of 5% and it is about assessing the likelihood of a threat on a Likert Scale of 1-
5.1 will mean low, and 5 will be a high risk factor.   
5. Estimated Risk Rating - A risk factor of 5% is given for this risk assessment 
calculation. The assessment is done on a scale of 0 -100. This is used to 
evaluate the risk when identified, its vulnerability and how it can be minimised 
further. 
6. Impact Category Level - The Impact Category Level on Denial of Service 
(DOS), Modification, Disclosure or Destruction is evaluated on a scale of 1 to 
4. The impact categories of Denial of Service, Modification, Disclosure or 
Destruction contribute to 10% of the weighted risk assessment analysis. When 
a threat is realised, its impact on the organisation is categorised by the nature 
of the attack. If the attack was to cause a DOS, the impact score of 1 is 
assigned. 
7. Number of Customers Affected - The number of customers affected also 
contributes to the total risk calculation on a weighted risk factor of 10%. When 
a security incident occurs, the organisation should be concerned over its 
customers’ ability to access the business processing network. The larger 
number of customers affected, the more serious is the impact of the threat. 
8. Incident Response Time - The Incident Response Time to act on a reported 
incident is measured on a scale of (1-10), and contributes a weighted risk factor 
of 5% to the total calculation. The response team reacts to a security incident 
to contain and mitigate it. The longer time the response team takes to mitigate 
the incident, the more critical will be the impact to the business mission. 
9. Business Impact level - The Business Impact Level to the organisation’s 
business mission can be measured as low, medium or high. This is used on a 
weighted risk factor of 25%. When a threat agent exploits vulnerabilities, the 
organisation can experience a severe impact on the organisational business 
goals. The impact on the organisational assets depend on its criticality to the 
organisational business goals (Pak, 2008). 
Pak’s assessment model gives a perspective of what the whole organisation could be 
exposed to and the effect on the overall risk levels.  This could be utilised to look at 
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the risk of the organisation holistically, without leaving to chance the internal and 
external stakeholders. Port-MIS can be assessed using such a method without having 
an expert on the systems risk factors.  
2.7 OVERVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND PORT MIS 
 
Management is “The process of dealing with or controlling things or people;  the 
responsibility for and control of a company or organisation ”(Oxford University, 2016a). 
Risk is seen as anything that has the potential to cause damage or danger to 
organisational assets (Oxford University, 2016b). 
Ntouskas and Polemi (2010) define Risk Management as a continuous process of 
recognising examining, handling, monitoring and reporting on the active risks of an 
organisation.  Risk Management is seen as an important administrative and 
governance goal of an organisation, aimed at protection of the organisation within and 
outside from risks that would affect the achievement of its goals negatively (Ntouskas 
& Polemi, 2010). 
Risk management is a process comprising the following steps: risk identification, risk 
analysis, risk planning and risk monitoring (Höst & Lindholm, 2007). It provides an 
actual method of assessing safety through risk assessment, mitigation and evaluation. 
Existing risk management methods are well recognised. However, it requires more 
precise and detailed understanding of the IT security territory along the establishment 
background (Ekelhart, Fenz & Neubauer, 2009). 
 
Risk management is known to be an organised method. It is a process of handling 
security through risk assessment, then devising plans to manage and mitigate risk 
using managerial resources. Strategies include giving the risk to a third party or hiding 
the risk. This could include limiting the negative consequences of the risk, and 
accepting some or all of the consequences of a particular risk. Risk could be the result  
of security threats, property value threats, threats that influence probability, property 
exposure to threats, threat influence on property or organisations and prevailing 
security threats (Jackson, 2008). 
Risk can be limited by enforcing one or more controls on a specific step in the 
processes of the business. Controls could be a specific technology that limits access 
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to an organisation’s premises; it could also be a procedure to complete a specific task 
in the organisational information assets. They are significantly different in reliability in 
terms of preventing fraudulent activities from system to system within an organisation. 
The controls are generic in their approach, which means they should be customised 
to each unique organisational set of systems (Rolland, Ulmer & Patterson, 2014). 
 
Effective use of risk management processes would assist managers to recognise the 
controls needed to sustain IT factors. However, for this reason a significant number of 
organisations assign enormous funds for IT security (Tohidi, 2011). Risk management 
is costly to an organisation, but is critically needed.  
 
Figure 2.4: Corporate IT Risk Management Model 
Source: (Spremiü, 2012:300)    
Spremiü (2012) presented Figure 2.4 as a holistic model for management corporate 
IT risks. The model includes business drivers, corporate governance policies, 
procedures and operational risks. According to Spremiu (2012), the following is an 
explanatory summary of a Corporate IT Risk Management Model: 
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 Business drivers have to be in line with corporate objectives; they should be 
regulatory requirements that are approved by the highest corporate structures. 
The lack of such support could put the organisation at great risk.  
 Corporate governance policies for managing IT risks are obligatory in all 
business echelons, and approved by the corporate executive structures.  They 
entail the establishment of various committees responsible for plans used for 
regulatory compliance and adoption of the industry best practice. 
 Procedures for managing IT risks on a business unit level, or functional level, 
should follow standards and norms set by international regulatory bodies.  
 Operational activities must be  guided by management procedures and 
governance policies that characterise the defence mechanisms against threat, 
with the intention to increase the level of defence on attacks and threats to IT 
resources (Spremiü, 2012). 
2.8 DISASTER RECOVER AND RISK MANAGEMENT  
 
Disasters happen all the time. However, numerous establishments are caught 
unaware or they make unrealistic assumptions about disasters. The reasons they 
submit are known as the myths that organisations make.  Disaster comes in different 
formats or types. Some known disaster types are presented below (Landry & Koger, 
2006). 
i) Natural Disasters 
Natural disasters happen. They cannot be predicted or prohibited from happening. 
Known examples are hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, earthquakes and snow storms. 
Their capabilities destroy a massive amount of physical assets. These disasters will 
not happen at all business locations, but only in specific areas of the world.  
ii) Technical Disasters  
Technical disasters are events that occur from hardware or software failure. Software 
failure resulting in information damage is the most important loss through technical 
disasters. The natural disasters cause some physical damage to the organisation, like 
the hardware needing to be replaced after the event. 
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iii) Human-Made Disasters 
Human disaster is destruction caused by an employee, former employee or an 
external person. The idea is to do both physical and information destruction. Some 
reasons for causing such disaster is through employee negligence, or perhaps 
corporate sabotage by another organisation. Trained or untrained employees can 
accidently, or deliberately, abolish physical resources while capturing incorrect 
information. This can cause costly errors that will be detrimental to the organisation’s 
success. In corporate sabotage, a competitor could be causing the destruction of an 
opponent’s physical location, or by launching cyber-attacks that could lead to 
information theft or loss (Vuong, 2015) .  
 
Despite the above known disasters, organisations still make assumptions about how 
to recover.  Landry & Koger (2006) outlined the myths surrounding the management 
of threats for an organisation, especially one like the Port MIS. 
Myth 1: The only disasters to plan for are natural disasters. 
 
Threats such as tornadoes, floods, blizzards, fires, earthquakes, tropical storms, 
hurricanes, mudslides, tsunami and volcanic eruptions do happen. There also needs 
to be a plan for the loss of human life as well. 
Myth 2: A mock test really tests disaster recovery. 
 
Any plan that has never been fully tested is useless: so the Port MIS recovery plans 
need to be regularly tested. 
Myth 3: Attacks and hacks are only external threats. 
 
Endogenous threats, as explained, are employees within an organisation that can be 
the source of deliberate or unplanned attacks on corporate assets. Endogenous 
threats are overwhelming. Exogenous threats are rooted in the quick access to local 
internet resources like the intranet, and the fact that most organisations feel relaxed 
about the use of the computer stations by their employees.  The Port MIS has to have 
restrictions, as well as within the organisation. 
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Myth 4: Untested disaster recovery (DR) hot sites.  
DR sites are places to work from in case of disasters, and employees were found to 
be not aware of these places. Employees should be made aware of such sites before 
they work on them during a disaster. A familiar environment is important. 
 
Myth 5: Conference rooms are adequate disaster recovery sites.  
 
Conference rooms are not workplaces, and are not prepared like workplaces. Such 
zones are not equipped to handle workers’ many communication lines, power and 
internet needs. A secondary well-equipped site that can manage the requirements for 
the work environment needs to be set up before disasters. 
Myth 6: Disaster recovery can be implemented later.  
 
The planning and building of Disaster Recovery sites are usually put off for later 
development to help save the cost and time associated with them. However, it should 
not be delayed as the system production time has the capability to draw all the 
resources towards it, and the DR planning might fail to materialise.  
Myth 7: Equipment will be available during and after the disaster.  
 
It should be noted that there would be no time to move all the resources during a 
disaster.  All the equipment will thus not be available. A plan has to be devised before 
disaster strikes. 
Myth 8: Back-ups work.  
 
Not all backups work according to the assumption that they would during a disaster. A 
strategy for a back-up plan needs to be concluded during the planning stages, and it 
should be implemented.The plans and implementation need to be tested before a 
disaster really strikes.     
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Myth 9: Disaster recovery can be planned individually.  
 
Centrally coordinated planning for disaster recovery is necessary. The greater and 
more compound the business, the more empirical it becomes. It has to be a centralised 
process for all DR plans. Each separate division should not be duplicating similar 
practices. 
 
Myth 10: Everyone knows what to do.  
 
Roles should be clearly identified and communicated before a disaster.  The reporting 
structures should be defined and lines of command, with their substitutes, should be 
identified as well. Movement to a new site should be easily done and users should be 
aware of an alternative site too (Landry & Koger, 2006). 
2.9 SUMMARY 
 
A Port MIS is a critical information system that supports middle management to make 
decisions about the operations at a port. The system, like any other information 
system, is exposed to many risks. Such risks have the potential to cause more 
damage. The environment has to be analysed and preventative action taken to prevent 
such damage. 
 
Threats to an Information system exist within and outside any organisation, and they 
pose risks. These risks should be minimised and assessed, using validated techniques 
and methods to determine their danger to the organisation’s survival. Risk assessment 
methodologies have advantages and disadvantages associated with them. However, 
there is no single method to assess risks. The solution is to use best industry practices 
such as OCTAVE, but with the supervision of an individual who is an expert in the 
analysis of the risks posed in that environment.  
 
When identified, the risk needs to be managed. It is highly likely that all risks can be 
eliminated. Managing risks can help the organisation to improve. However, there are 
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huge costs needed to minimise risk exposure. The techniques of analysing risk can 
help if an individual who is appointed to assess the company follows its strategies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PORT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 3 presents a literature review on Port Management Information Systems 
(PORT MIS), along with port functions, port operations and port users. It reviews 
PORT MIS subsystems that support the port business functions. The ports are a 
gateway for the arrival and departure of a number of passengers and a range of goods. 
This is a result of global trade that has rapidly grown. This has led to a huge increase 
of growth in trade of goods distributed by the maritime sector (Klopott, 2013). They 
help the growth of exports and imports exchange, and play a role in how PORT MIS 
is implemented.  
Chapter 3 explains who the role players are. The focus is on subsystems that make 
up Port MIS - what they serve to accomplish, along with their business functions and 
the departments that use them. A brief overview of the system and its importance to 
the ports is included.   
3.2 PORT-MIS FUNCTIONS OVERVIEW 
 
A presentation by the Korean Maritime Institute outlined the main functions of Port 
MIS, as depicted in Figure 3.1 below:  
 
Figure 3.1: Port MIS Functions  
Source : (Kim, 2013:4) 
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The above PORT-MIS functions provide the following benefits:  
 Smooth management of vessel arrival/departure and cargo handlings by 
transferring and using information about vessel, cargo and port facilities through 
information systems. 
 Avoiding unforeseen coincidences by monitoring vessel movements 
(arrival/departure, berthing) and port facilities through management 
information. 
 Allowing optimal use of limited port facilities by providing port management 
information on a real-time basis. 
 Uplifting stakeholder credibility on port operations by providing paperless 
administration, removal of user permits/ visits to governmental organisations 
and fast port operation information services (Cabezas & Kasoulides, 2004). 
3.3 PORT ROLE PLAYERS  
 
In order to facilitate the movement of goods in and out of a port, there are people 
appointed as port operators and users. Their roles might differ from port to port. This 
study presents what is common to South African and Nigerian ports. Goodhope & 
Polytechnic (2014) outlined the personnel employed at ports through their job 
descriptions, as follows: 
 3.3.1 Port Operators and Users 
 
 Terminal Operators 
These are companies that own and operate terminals (Baird, 2002). In the South 
African context, the ports operator is Transnet (PTY) LTD.  
 
 Stevedores Companies 
Stevedore companies supply dockworkers and are also in charge of other welfare 
undertakings. Dockworkers are workers or labourers who are employed on vessels at 
dock.  Their normal jobs encompass packing and unloading of freight, recording of 
loads on vessels or keeping load registers. 
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 Exporters and Importers  
These are key operatives in the port system. They are the core of intercontinental 
trade. Without their services, no intercontinental trade can take place. Importers and 
exporters are companies or individuals that embark on export and import trade. 
 Warehouse Operators 
These are companies in the port that offer warehousing services for clients to store 
cargo, either within or close to the port premises. 
 Haulage Companies 
Haulage companies are enterprises in the port that offer transportation and logistics 
services. They do transportation of cargo in and out of ports to selected end-points. 
 Chandlers 
Chandlers are focused agents that supply food items to vessels that come to the dock. 
 Freight Forwarding and Clearing Agents 
These specialised companies do clearing and forwarding functions. Freight forwarding 
is a demanding occupation and it is of importance in supporting the logistics business 
(Shang, Chao, & Lirn, 2016). 
 Maintenance Companies 
These companies do ship repairs and maintenance (Goodhope & Polytechnic, 2014). 
 The Port Authorities 
The role of seaport authorities in governing the regionalisation phase will slightly differ 
according to the type of port utilization. Port authorities work together with numerous 
patrons (haulers, movers, transport operators, labour and government organisations) 
to identify and address concerns affecting logistics. 
Port authorities concentrate largely on the general efficiency and progression of trade, 
rather than on the performance of particular sectors. The port authority can be a 
catalyst even when its direct impact on cargo flow is limited. Port authorities are known 
to endorse an efficient intermodal system in order to secure cargo under conditions of 
high competition (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2005). 
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3.3.2 Government Agencies   
These are government owned parastatals. Their responsibility is to prevent dangerous 
contamination of the marine environment and to ensure that practices are in line with 
international standards (Goodhope & Polytechnic, 2014). Government agencies are  
Customs Officers and Waterway Police, among others (Shang et al., 2016).  
In most countries, other government agencies are involved at the border, with the 
Customs Office as the lead agency. These include:  
 Safety agencies  
 Plant, drug and food inspectors  
 Immigration  
 Police and security agencies  
 Trading standards organisations (Ojadi & Walters, 2015). 
3.4 THE PORT MIS  
The role players clearly have their responsibilities in facilitating the movement and 
support of goods. However, there still needs to be a system that facilitates the 
responsibilities of all the role players. Figure 3.2 illustrates the Port Management 
Information System (Port-MIS), developed by the KLNet Corporation. The system has 
five fields of management: The Vessel, Cargo, Facilities, Billing and Statistics 
Management (KOSDAQ- Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation, 2015). 
Port-MIS is an information system, and like any other information system it has a 
structured database. Figure 3.2 illustrates what the schema of the system would be 
and how it serves its stakeholders. Stakeholders are those who have a vested interest 
in the system and are depicted outside the boundaries of the system schema. Also 
depicted is the information or data stored on the system by its users. The information 
required by stakeholders differs from function to function. 
32 
 
  
 
Figure 3.2: Port MIS Schema 
 Source : (KOSDAQ Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation, 2015:8) 
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the database schema, showing the interested stakeholders of the 
cargo management system. Shipping companies are likely to make requests on the 
system. However, the Regional Port Office is more likely to be managing the facilities 
when needed.  
The system in Figure 3.2 depicts the Shipping companies and Regional port operators 
as the role players. All role players have different duties to fulfil in the port operations. 
These operations impact on the Port-MIS. These role players, using the Port MIS, 
together discuss their functions within the port. 
Figure 3.2 shows the system as a control system. 
However, Figure 3.3 shows the system as a management system. In addition, any 
researcher studying the system will have to use the term ‘management’ instead of 
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control. The word ‘control’ in this context has more focus on the technical and 
engineering related aspects of the ports, thus it has to be used with caution. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Port MIS Conceptual Model  
SOURCE : http://www.klnet.co.kr/english/product/product1_1.html 
The Port-MIS has sub-systems that contribute to the whole system. The sub-systems 
can be seen in Figure 3.3 as having a list of management functions that it has to 
perform. The following sections discuss these management functions and the list of 
goals or activities to be undertaken by each management system. The first system is 
that of vessel management. 
3.4.1 Vessel Management  
Vessel management has to do with the services offered by the ports regarding vessels. 
These services provide information about vessel position to all agents. They include 
administrative procedures, e-communication with maritime/port authorities, police, 
immigration, monitoring services, navigation services and vessel authentication 
(Dellios & Polemi, 2012).  Vessel management in the ports is significant to the shipping 
industry, as can be seen by how many government stakeholders have an interest in 
information about vessels. 
The shipping industry has been categorised as a high-risk industry, due to the threats 
that vessels and crewmembers face daily. Poor shipping management can result in 
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accidents that differ in scope. They comprise loss of human life, enormous marine 
pollution and damage to a ship or its cargo, among others. Therefore, it is very 
important for a ship operator or a port manager to have access to all relevant 
information. The information has to be effectively managed, including the berths 
utilised by the vessels closer to the port (Karahalios, 2014). 
Berths and their management form part of the vessel management. Port MIS stores 
information about them. Berth management should not be careless, thus exposing 
vessels to risk. Carelessness in berth assignments has resulted in accidents, where 
deserted vessels can cost the company millions in the currency of a country (Xu, Li, & 
Leung, 2012).  
Threats to vessels imply threats to Port MIS as well. Threats indicate the importance 
of the system in the operation of the ports. There are also physical threats to guard 
against. Physical access threats are when unauthorised parties get direct physical 
access to ship systems, communication systems or shore assets. It is an obvious 
threat as it allows these parties to introduce malware or to interfere with the system. 
Even trusted personnel can be a threat, either because of carelessness or because of 
bitterness against the company or persons in the company (Rødseth, Marinteknisk & 
As, 2013).  If threats are not addressed properly, there could be no system to work 
with as an end result. 
If there is no vessel management system in a port, chaos will result and vessel collision 
and other accidents will abound  (Herdzik, 2012). This highlights the need to study 
such a system and how it should address the needs of Port MIS. KLNet Corporation 
identified some information needs that should be gathered by the Port MIS. 
 Vessel Movement information  
 
Such information is attained from integrated ship management information 
systems (ISMIS). This can be used to plan distributed vessel management sub-
systems, as in a ship sailing on inland rivers. This would inhibit transportation 
congestion and prevent accidents happening (Wu, Chen, Hu, Shi, & Mo, 2012). 
The purpose of vessel movement information is to manage traffic flow and 
protect against delays and accidents.  
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 Monitoring of Vessels  
Vessel monitoring is closely related to the vessel movement information, and 
information gathered can help to reduce fatalities that may arise as a result of 
unmonitored ships. The importance of vessel monitoring is to reduce fatalities 
that may arise.  
 
 Berth Management Information 
Berth management information helps with the scheduling of the berths, thus 
decreasing the cost of ships/vessels being idle. These vessels have to be 
known before reaching a port, avoiding delays that may result in more cost due 
to delivery delays. Berths form part of the vessel management system. A major 
challenge facing shipping lines is the limited number of berths at seaports. If no 
berth is available, vessels have to delay docking. This delays delivery days, 
raising the cost of the operation (Herdzik, 2012). 
 
 Inner Harbour Vessel Information and Specification 
This is similar to vessel monitoring. Vessel specification includes all details that 
cover the amount of explosives, toxic substances, flammables in bulk and non-
gas free cargo, among others. The release of such freight has to be monitored. 
These vessels are obliged to display a red flag during daylight and an all-round 
red light at night. Some other vessels are required to maintain a half-mile 
separation from identified vessels. 
Within the inner harbour, vessel information required is the authorisation from 
the Harbour Master before any movement. This is given for indication of 
overtaking or separation from a specified vessel (Department of Transport, 
2009). Facts are recorded about vessel specification, while the Harbour Master 
regulates how to act when vessels are to approach the inner harbour. All 
information on vessels are recorded by the Port MIS, whether they are at sea 
or in the port. 
3.4.2 Cargo Management  
 
Cargo management has Cargo Management Systems are about services that provide 
e-documentation to all proxies involved: cargo e-management, e-information about 
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container status, cargo authentication and monitoring services navigation services 
(Dellios & Polemi, 2012). The services are about cargo that is shipped in containers in 
most instances.  
The cargo containers have been documented as major role players, which led to them 
being part of management systems/ departments. They have emerged as a 
fundamental means of transporting mass-produced merchandise in a supply chain 
logistics system. The need for containers arose when the undertaking of barrels, 
individual boxes and crates became slow and labour exhaustive at seaports 
(Govender & Mbhele, 2014). 
Containers in cargo management are of importance as most goods are transported 
this way. Cargo management, particularly in the maritime domain, play a vital part in 
the transfer of goods between seller and buyer. Despite such importance, with over 
90% of the world’s worldwide trade being sea based, there is actually little known about 
this subject (Rowbotham, 2014).  
A cargo management system encompasses a lot of proxies. The interested 
stakeholders have their information regarding their cargo through e-documentation. 
However, there is little known about these systems. Figure 3.3 confirms that such e-
documentation has to have information about the vessels, and this information has to 
come from vessel management systems. Figure 3.3 noted that information on 
dangerous cargo forms part of the management system.  
Cargo movement and container movement are integrated as the cargo is moved in 
containers. Currently, the container movement in a port is totally managed by 
computerised software systems. There are systems for cars which are transported as 
cargo in containers. This system is known as the "Vehicle Booking System" (VBS). It 
allocates period slots for road carriers to book their time to come and pick up their 
containers (Pudhota, 2012). Within the container/cargo movement, the most important 
factor is the management of the cargo pick up and packing.  
All cargo has to be paid for, and cargo wharf clearance is closely related to the Billing 
Management System. Clearance is part of the handling of cargo in ports, with special 
focus on dangerous cargo. Hazardous and dangerous goods require professional 
management due to their volatile and unstable nature. They can be toxic, explosive, 
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or ﬂammable, and often require dedicated and specialist handling facilities at the ports 
during loading and unloading.  
Loading onto the vessel must be done in such a way that they do not risk influencing 
or compromising the safety of the vessel and its crew.  The dangers of the cargo have 
to be properly sent to the port managers, the shipping lines and the shipping agents 
(Rowbotham, 2014). Dangerous cargo requires delicacy when being handled as they 
are toxic and harmful. They have to be noted on the Vessel Management system. 
Cargo management has to do with services rendered to shipping companies and other 
interested parties using, amongst other things, containers to move their products. How 
to handle dangerous cargo in containers includes, among other things, information 
that needs to be conveyed in an organised system.  
3.4.3 Billing Management   
 
A leading information system developer, the Klein Systems Group, states that a billing 
system (as a sub-system of a Port MIS) has to perform the following calculations: 
 Wharfage  
Automated calculation of wharfage is based on customer and commodity 
codes, inter-modal and multi-modal transport discounts and other relevant 
factors. 
 Dockage & Pilotage  
Pilotage is guiding a vessel on a river channel, for example, from the mouth of 
the Columbia River to Portland. Pilotage fees are charges for mooring a vessel 
at a wharf (Oregon State University, 1981). An automatic charge calculation of 
dockage and pilotage is conducted, based on the length of the vessel, time and 
other factors. Calculation charges are for monthly, twenty-four hour days, 
hourly, six-hour days and many other billing options. This is also needed for 
vessel information management, along with vessel scheduling so that the 
preparation of bills can be automated and founded on vessel movement, onset 
time, period from anchor to berth, berth to berth etc. 
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 Lease invoicing 
This is the ability to invoice automatically for rent, including a year-on-year 
inflationary raise in the rental amount. Rent is for the facilities offered.  
 Electronic Invoicing  
This is the ability to automatically email, fax and mail invoices to terminal operators, 
stakeholders, shipping lines and any other transacting parties. It should setup 
customer preferences for billing based on combined invoices.  
 Bunkerage Invoicing  
This is invoicing for fuel and any service charges for the bunkerage. 
 Guaranteed Contract Minimums / Guaranteed Annual Minimum (GAM) 
Invoicing  
This is the ability to automatically calculate short falls from agreed upon contract 
minimums or GAMs, and then to bill them at the pre-agreed occurrence on the 
quarterly, annual invoice etc. (Ignify, 2016).  
 Tariff Collection 
Customs agencies are responsible for the collection of tariffs and fees at ports of 
entry. This is their known duty, such as protection of intellectual property through 
the prohibition of forgery merchandise, the deterrence of dangerous goods from 
entering the country, and the prevention of illegitimate entry (Han & McGauran, 
2014). 
The port tariffs charged are dependent on the category of services offered to the 
customer, who could be an importer or an exporter. The tariff items are separated 
between charges to the vessel, and charges to the cargo. These charges are 
influenced by a variety of factors, including the nature of the merchandise 
handled or carried, the nature of the carrying ship used, the capacity of trade and 
the elasticity of demand for the product (Strandenes & Marlow, 2000). 
 
 Investment Reserve 
A study, titled “Russian ports to charge investment dues already in 2017” (Port 
Today, 2017), on investment reserves showed that the Russian Ministry of 
Transportation introduced special investment charges at national seaports. This 
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was dependent on the vessels used. The sole purpose of the investment was to 
support building and expansion of state-owned facilities in seaports. It is a charge 
imposed on all cargo vessels at their seaports (Port Today, 2017). The revenue is 
generated through additional charges, which can be imposed on for use of safe 
passage. Vessels are obligated to meet the costs intended to compensate the 
investment into infrastructure and superstructure to the states having control of the 
area (Vukić, Peronja, & Slišković, 2018). 
 Late Fees  
Late fees or demurrage are charges incurred if the time limits of ocean vessel 
contracts are not met (Gleim, 2009). 
 Automatic Transfers  
This transfer of information is provided by the Automatic Identification System 
(AIS). It includes vessel parameters such as: name, length, nationality, operation 
type, berth quay, company, arrival date, source port, port code, ship type, cruise 
transit, Lloyd code, departure date, bollards, call sign and destination port 
(Fernández et al., 2016). 
Billing systems are pivotal to reducing cost and hardship to gather income. This 
has features embedded in them, such as customer or vessel contract 
management, rate table based tariffs, multiple inputs for a single tariff, automated 
billing procedures and Account Receivables. The tariffs are easy to update; 
complex tariffs are automatically controlled, reducing billing errors and calculation 
time. Contract management is automatic, reducing the time to generate 
appropriate discounts, special rates and manage minimum guarantees. All 
invoicing on the system is automated and operational data and financial data are 
kept synchronised (Kleinport, 2016). 
3.4.4 Facilities Management  
 
Facilities Management (FM) is a new field of study developed within engineering, as 
well as a new service sector that has been developing due to outsourcing of non-core 
competencies (such as cleaning and office management) to third party providers. It 
has varied definitions, and is understood to be the integration of organisational 
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processes in order to maintain and develop the services supporting and improving the 
effectiveness of the primary processes.  
FM is also described as an integrated approach to operating, maintaining, improving 
and adapting the buildings and infrastructure of an organisation in order to create an 
environment that strongly supports its primary objectives. These views are implicitly 
based on the concept of the value chain, distinguishing between the primary and 
secondary activities of an organisation (Scupola, 2012).  
FM can be seen as a non-primary core business of the seaport. Within the ports, the 
building and infrastructure refer to the storage areas and warehouses used for cargo 
that has to be shipped out, and cargo that has been shipped in. Ports have to provide 
facilities and services for vessels and freight – this includes infrastructure, building, 
equipment and services to ships and services to cargo (Cullinane, Song, & Wang, 
2003). These are of importance to the ports, but they are not primarily the field of 
outmost importance to the function of a port. A system enabling FM at ports would 
assist with availability of its services to the relevant stakeholders. 
3.4.5 Statistics Management  
 
Port statistics have traditionally been within the realm of terminal operators, local port 
authorities or national associations. Largely, these entities decided what data was  
collected and, more importantly, how and when the data was disseminated (UNCTAD, 
2014). The role of the Port Authority is to oversee and administer commercial 
operations within each port by regulating pricing, and supervising access to basic port 
infrastructure (ASH Centre for Democratic Governance and Innovation, 2011). 
In a competitive environment, Information Communication Technology (ICT) systems 
play a strong supporting role in accompanying the evolution of port authorities and 
sustaining their growth strategies. Generally, the use of ICT to gain competitive 
advantage has become a key strategic issue amongst organisations in the fast 
globalising environment (Cepolina & Ghiara, 2013). Statistics management systems 
should help ports to be competitive. However, they are selective on what they collect 
to be competitive. The first information gathered would be that of vessel and cargo 
movement along the reports on port congestion and global trend index. 
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 Vessel Movement  
Information on the movement of vessels is gathered through another system, known 
as the Vehicle Management System (VMS). It is similar to the VBS. It is known to offer 
instantaneous vessel movement tracking at a glance and anytime, and keeps the 
history of vessel movement (Alfayyadh, 2017). Knowing such information would be 
important for decision-making on the port’s activities. 
 Cargo Movement  
Figure 3.4 explains cargo movement statistics as being part of port statistics. The 
focus is on the purpose of a port. Ports serve as sea-land interfaces for the movement 
of cargo and passengers. As a crucial part of multimodal transport, they are of great 
economic and strategic importance to the country where they are located. 
 
 Figure 3.4: Port operations interface within the multimodal transport chain. 
Source: (Ibrahimi, 2009:3) 
Cargo movement statistics include performance pointers spread from port operational 
and financials to environmental, safety, security and trade aiding issues.  However, in 
port operations, as seen in Figure 3.4, it has to do with cargo movement from land to 
sea and vice-versa. More specifically, the following cargo movement concerns are 
critical: 
 Cargo movement consignment transportation vehicles, such as vessels, trucks 
and trains.  
 The direct movement of cargo from ships to trains and trucks and vice-versa. 
 The incidental movement of cargo between transportation vehicles and 
numerous storing spaces. 
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 The movement to storage facilities, courtyards, sheds and storerooms 
(Ibrahimi, 2009). Cargo movement statistics are concerned with the moving of 
cargo to and from land to the ports; the use of inland transportation; and inter-
portal movement that encompasses movement to different storage facilities.  
Statistics management includes billing records, which refers to information that is part 
of a billing module. A billing module is the maintenance of a precise account of terminal 
operations, the management of numerous types of billing codes with prices or special 
contracts that a port has with its business partners, as well as the issuing of invoices. 
The following are features of the billing module: 
 Invoicing for credit  
 Receipt for cash 
 Payment summary 
 Code management such as tariff code, invoice unit, and demurrage. Data 
gathering on terminal operation (Alfayyadh, 2017).  
Another part of statistics information gathered in Port MIS entails the invoicing, register 
of cash with summary, and invoices for units serviced by the ports. 
  
 Port Congestion Index and Global Trends 
Port congestion is explained as the greatest time intensive dealings for the port 
operations management. It influences the efficiency of the port operations in an 
undesirable way. Port congestion occurs when the port and terminal capabilities are 
not adequate enough to deal with the traffic received at the port, causing waiting times. 
There are numerous factors that cause vessels to build-up at ports: bad weather, 
strikes, insufficient infrastructure, poor management etc. Ship pile-up at anchorage 
can also be a major safety and environmental issue for ports (Romers, 2013).  
Congestion at a port is one of many factors that could be a threat to safety, and could 
affect the environment. Port management needs a Port MIS to help them to deal with 
congestion. There are different types of congestion, and management has to be given 
information from the statistics system on them. Such information will identify the type 
of congestion and the explanation for their cause:  
i. Ship Berth Congestion 
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This results from crowding by ships waiting on the port mouth paths. The 
delay could be that other vessels are occupying the existing berth elected, 
or likely to be allocated to the up-coming traffic. 
ii. Ship Work Congestion   
This is a result of delays in the processing of work on loading and / or off -
loading the ship, which results in slowdowns that could lengthen the interval 
of time that the ship had to stay in port to realise the cargo operation 
assignment. 
 
iii. Vehicle Gate Congestion 
This is a result of poor scheduling of landward admission to the port through 
trucks which are programmed arrivals at the port gate. If impediments or 
programming defaults occur, the system sends instantaneously queuing 
indications to automobiles entering or exiting the port gate for delivery or 
evacuation of cargo. This becomes a consequence of port gate congestion. 
iv. Vehicle Work Congestion 
This mainly emanates from lapses related to the packing or unpacking of 
trucks and vehicles.  The absence of necessary apparatus to do the work of 
packing and unpacking, or low productivity from necessary vehicle work can 
cause this congestion.  
v. Cargo Stack Congestion  
This results from a constant stay of cargo in the storing area, over the 
agreed number of hours/days or above the determined capability of the 
cargo stacking area. 
 iv.  Ship Entry / Exit Route Congestion 
           This arises when there is any incidental barricade on the naval side access 
paths to the port facility. Such a barricade would lead to queues and 
ultimately extending a ship’s turn-around time at the port facility (GIDADO, 
2015).  
The congestion experienced is dependent on the type of factors contributing to it. They 
start with problems at berthing, work done on packing and unpacking of cargo along 
vehicles and trucks, the storage facilities not being enough to do undocking to nearest 
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storage facilities, the access of vehicles working on the cargo to and from the ships 
and the route management on entry and exit. 
All of the factors discussed would be an integral part of the information that the Port 
MIS system would collate for port managers to execute their duties to run efficient 
ports.  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 3 has shown that ports help to facilitate the export and import of goods. This 
happens with the help of port role players and the Port MIS, a system that supports 
five business functions. The five business functions relate to vessel management, 
cargo management, facilities management, billing management and port statistics 
management. These systems are interrelated, and share the information in one 
system with another.  
The vessel management information gathered can be used by the statistics 
management to report on what types of vessels have been to the port. The information 
can be also used to report on cargo delivered, as it has information relating to the type 
of vessels used for the operation. This is another way to show that cargo management 
relates to the vessel management and gathers information as such.  
The cargo has to be housed on delivery, thus information about what has been 
imported has to show what capabilities the Facilities Management department is able 
to store. All this cargo has to be paid for, and this relates to Billing Management. Billing 
management has to do with the billing that relates to the cargo delivered or exported 
as this is of interest to authorities as port role players. The billing is also determined 
according to the type of services rendered. Cargo management will be of importance 
in the sharing of information to automatically charge accordingly. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 4 explains the methodology of how the research was conducted and the 
reason for the choice of the methodology. The research design, research instruments, 
questionnaires for the quantitative data and sample of respondents are reviewed. A 
qualitative method of research was adopted. 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
According to Bernard (2000), research design “is the careful planning and 
implementation of a process of knowing, on which a priori planning of all phases of 
research which includes analysis and writing, can benefit one’s research in several 
ways” (Bernard, 2000). A worthy research design is clearly well-defined, uniformity 
flanked by research questions and methods which will produce valid and dependable 
data and which can be achieved by the existing resources of conducting research 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2014). 
Chapters 2 and 3 addressed the theoretical perspective of the research design and 
briefly addressed the research questions. This research study was on Transnet Ports 
across South Africa. It focussed on risk assessment on Port MIS, and how 
management should be addressing the issues regarding risk. The study explored the 
value of the subsystems that make up Port MIS.   
A questionnaire was constructed and sent to Transnet (Pty) Ltd. A sample of Port MIS 
users had to answer the questionnaires. The sample was selected out of the full 
population of the Port Management Information Systems (Port MIS) users. The sample 
included managers and subordinates who use the Port MIS. Their input complemented 
the theory presented. 
4.3 POPULATION AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
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Population  
Defining and selecting the population sample was guided by the following questions. 
• What were the primary population or populations in your study? 
 The primary population of the study was Transnet (Pty) Ltd Port MIS users who 
 happen to be middle managers. The study on Port MIS had to focus on the 
 users who are exposed to the system risks. 
• Are there subpopulations within the population that are of particular interest? 
 The middle managers and managers use the Port MIS to make decisions that 
 affect operations. They make up the primary population. However, the Port MIS 
 is fed information or data by other sub-systems. The users of the sub-systems 
 form a sub-population, and they also need to address the risks to Port MIS. 
• Would it benefit your study to include groups of individuals other than the primary   
   population? That is, who are the key stakeholders? 
 The study will benefit by including the other Port MIS users, such as the 
 subordinates that feed the system with data. They also represent all the 
 stakeholders within the system. 
• Are there specific individuals whom you should include? 
 The Port MIS users have to be included in this study (Bernard, 2000). 
The purpose of the study was to give an overview of how risk is managed under the 
Port MIS. The sample included users of Port MIS at manager and staff level.  
Sampling is of concern to control the success of a project. There are different 
procedures in qualitative research that guide the selection of respondents, as it is not 
about counting opinions or people. It is about exploring the range of opinions and 
different representations of an issue that is being investigated. Sampling in qualitative 
research is concerned with the richness of information and the number of participants 
required (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012).  
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For this research study, the sample was selected using purposive sampling. Purposive 
sampling is heterogeneous sampling, also known as maximum variation sampling. It 
is a deliberate strategy to include phenomena which may vary widely from each other. 
The aim is to identify central themes which cut across the variety of cases or people 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2014). 
The study sampling can be described as heterogeneity purposive as the sample was 
selected from the group of Port MIS manager-users, and the group of subordinate-
users. These groups both have differences, where one is of managers and the latter 
being their subordinates. However, they use the same Port MIS and address the same 
problem. 
4.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
Research methodology is a science that defines the principles of methods to study a 
subject. It is for developing a process containing all the elements required, allowing 
descriptions, explaining and predicting a phenomenon, process or effects (Mitra & 
Borza, 2015). For this study, the research methodology used questionnaires to 
establish how the Port MIS users manage the risks relating to them.  
The researcher had to use a methodology that provides a practical and accessible 
explanation of what is being investigated in a particular study. The following questions 
had to be considered: 
• Why the researcher chose that focus; 
• Why the study was designed by the researcher in that way; 
• Why alternatives were rejected; 
• What were the questions the researcher was asking, and 
• How did the researcher ensure that confidence could be felt in the data gathered and     
  in the analysis of that data (Case & Light, 2011). 
Attempts to answer the above questions are addressed in the following paragraphs on 
positivistic, phenomenological and mixed methods. 
4.4.1 Positivistic / Qualitative  
 
A Positivistic or qualitative research study is defined as a developing, inductive, 
interpretive and naturalistic approach to a study. It is a reading of people, cases, 
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phenomena, social situations and processes in their usual settings in order to disclose 
in descriptive terms the meanings that people attach to their experiences of the world. 
It should be noted that qualitative research is not based on a single methodology and 
does not belong to a single discipline (Yilmaz, 2013). The Positivistic approach was 
chosen for this study to explore how the users of Port MIS were experiencing and 
addressing risk related to the systems. 
It should be noted that qualitative methods have typically been used more in the study 
of Information Systems (IS) and in other social sciences for exploratory research in 
order to develop a deep understanding of a phenomenon and/ or to inductively 
generate new theoretical insights (Venkatesh & Brown, 2013 ). This is what this study 
will try to achieve by looking at existing theory of risk management and how it will be 
applied to Port MIS. There is not much research done on Port MIS, and it is thus fitting 
that a qualitative study be done, together with a quantitative study. 
In order to achieve validity, there should be an adequate sample size of users to get 
the results. It is said that the quality of qualitative research, to a considerable extent, 
relates to sampling adequacy that should provide wisdom and maximum opportunity 
for transferability of findings (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012). The sample chosen came from 
all Transnet ports in South Africa.  
The selected sample filled in the questionnaire on the premises of their companies. 
The reason for the latter is that some of the respondents were in displaced cities.  
There are potential advantages of using the online questionnaires for research, is 
saving in time and travel costs and greater anonymity around sensitive topics (Irvine, 
Drew, & Sainsbury, 2013). 
The questionnaires were constructed so as to get in-depth knowledge of risk as related 
to Port MIS. They formed the basis of the interviews conducted. The purpose of in-
depth interviewing is not to get answers to questions, nor to test hypotheses, and not 
to "evaluate" as it is normally used. At the root of in-depth interviewing is an interest in 
understanding the existed experiences of other individuals and the sense they make 
of that experience (Seidtnan, 2006). Untapped knowledge on Port Risk Management 
was sought. 
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4.4.2 Phenomenological Approach / Quantitative  
 
Quantitative research is about investigating a phenomenon by collecting numerical 
data that is analysed using mathematically based methods,  specifically statistics 
(Muijs, 2005). Thus, a questionnaire was distributed to Transnet Port MIS users to 
assess how they manage risk relating to the system they use. 
The purpose of quantitative studies was for the researcher to project his or her findings 
onto the larger population through an objective process. Data collected, often through 
surveys administered to a sample or subset of the entire population, allows the 
researcher to generalise or make inferences. Results are interpreted to determine the 
probability that the conclusions found among the sample can be replicated within the 
larger population (Borrego & Tech, 2009). 
4.4.3 Mixed Method Approach  
 
A mixed method study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or 
qualitative data in a single study in which the data is collected concurrently or 
sequentially, is given priority, and involves the integration of the data at one or more 
stages in the process of research (Borrego & Tech, 2009).  
Quantitative and qualitative research designs differ in terms of their epistemological, 
theoretical and methodological underpinnings. Quantitative research seeks to develop 
descriptive universal laws in social behaviours by statistically measuring what it 
assumes to be a static reality. It stresses the measurement and analysis of causal 
relationships between isolated variables within a framework which is value-free, 
logical, reductionist, and deterministic, based on a priori theories (Yilmaz, 2013). 
Mixed method research studies are seen to be the meaningful merging of qualitative 
and quantitative approaches. They offer a completely diverse new strand of research 
methodology that allows researchers to get data about both the individual and the 
broader societal context, and conveys the results of the qualitative and the quantitative 
paradigms (Lisle, 2011). 
  
50 
 
4.4.4 Rationale of the Research Paradigm 
 
For this study, a questionnaire was considered an effective method for gathering data 
from clients when a focus group or semi-structured number of respondents was not a 
possibility (Veith, 2015).  
4.4.5 Design of the questionnaire  
 
The questionnaire was designed to answer all the research questions as presented in 
Chapter 1.  
4.5 DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
The response profile was concerned with who the respondents were and the 
demographics of the aforementioned individuals.  There were twenty-four (24)  
respondents who replied to an online questionnaire. The researcher expected that a 
total of 21 respondents would have made up 10% of the targeted sample in relation to 
the number of questions included in the survey instrument (Wegner, 2007).. The 
response rate was, therefore, better than anticipated. The questionnaire was 
distributed to Transnet employees via a third party, which makes it impossible to 
confirm how many users and actual employees were working on the system. 
 
Figure 4.1: Number of Sub-system Users by department 
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Sub-system Number of users = 24 
Vessel  Management 3 
Report or Statistics/ 
Vessel Management/ 
Cargo Management 
8 
Billing Management 1 
Facilities Management 1 
Other(s): 
New Business Development 
Operations 
Risk Management 
Operations 
Procurement 
Payroll 
Occupational Health, Health  
and Environmental Management Systems  
Human Resources 
SHE IMS/ SHE Management 
 
11 
Table 4.1: Number of Sub-system Users 
 
The employees were targeted based on what is known about users of the system or 
from the known department complementing the system, as illustrated in the graph in 
Figure 4.1 above. The respondents from vessel management, report statistics, cargo 
management and facilities management made up (54%) of the respondents. However, 
none of the other respondents (46%) were excluded from the study since only the 
distributor of the questionnaire knew the internal use of the system in operations. The 
users could be working on the system with different titles, (other than what is illustrated 
in Figure 3.1), related to the system and thus it was assumed that a representative 
group of users was selected for the study. 
 
The next section discusses the level of management occupied by the respondents. 
 
The level of management occupied by most (66%) respondents fall within the level of 
senior and middle management, befitting that an MIS would be used by such end 
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users. Figure 4.2 gives a good illustration that both senior and middle management 
are both highly represented as compared to non-supervisory respondents, with the 
smallest number of respondents being Junior Managers. 
 
  
Figure 4.2: Percentage Levels of Management  
 
Level of Management within the 
organisation  
Percentage 
Junior Management  13% 
Middle Management  33% 
Non-supervisory staff 21 
Senior Management 33% 
Table 4.2: Percentage Levels of Management 
The majority of respondents were from the targeted groups, thus giving the desired 
credibility to the sample respondents.   
The next aspect was the geographic location demarcation of the respondents.  
The questionnaire was targeted at all 8 ports of South Africa. The respondents include 
representatives from all the ports. Figure 4.2 illustrates all the 8 port respondents, 
including the TNPA, which is the ports’ national headquarters. They have a vested 
interest in the operations as the head office. The most interesting aspect was that the 
majority of the users were from the port of Ngqurha; followed by the port of Port 
Elizabeth, with the rest of the respondents being from each of the other ports.  
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Figure 4.3: Percentages by Port Base 
 
 
Port Base Pecentage 
Durban 4% 
Mossel Bay 4% 
Ngqurha 50% 
Port Elizabeth 34% 
Saldanha Bay 4% 
TNPA 4% 
Table 4.3: Percentages by Port Base 
 
In terms of geographical location, it could be said that 84% of the respondents were 
from the Eastern Cape region.  
 
4.6 MEASUREMENT CHARACTERISTICS  
 
Measurement is the assigning of numbers to observations in order to enumerate 
phenomena (Kimberlin & Winterstein, 2008). This study is both qualitative and 
quantitative. Sampling in qualitative research is concerned with the richness of 
information and the number of participants required in order to enumerate the 
4% 4%
50%
34%
4%
4%
Port Base
Port Base Durban Mossel Bay Ngqura Port Elizabeth Saldanha Bay TNPA
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phenomena (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012). The sample comprised of 24 respondents from 
an unknown population of Port MIS users, as only Transnet knows the numbers.  
Knowing that a sample was used, it meant that the research measuring instrument 
results should be inferred to the population as whole. Therefore, the measuring 
instruments used must be valid, reliable and the result be generalisable. The following 
section addresses reliability, validity and generalisability pertaining to this study.   
4.6.1 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
For the purpose of this study, a survey was conducted using questionnaires (see 
Appendix B) as a research instrument. They were distributed and administered by the 
researcher. A questionnaire afforded the opportunity to get insight on the topic being 
investigated. The other instrument used was an interview with the managers and users 
to gauge their understanding of risk and management. 
 Questionnaires 
Questionnaires are one of the primary sources of gaining data in any research study. 
Closed-ended (or structured) questions were used in the questionnaires for this study. 
They allow the reviewer to control what the question asks and get answers on only 
what is being probed (Zohrabi, 2013). 
 Validity  
Validity is defined as the extent to which an instrument measures what it purports to 
measure. The questionnaires and interviews had to be valid in addressing the issues 
of Port MIS risk management.  Validity requires that an instrument is reliable as well. 
 Reliability  
Reliability can be measured in multiple ways, depending on the type of instrument 
being used. The most common forms include: test-retest; internal consistency and 
scorer reliability (Hagan, 2014). Reliability refers to an item being tested receiving the 
same responses at different times. 
 Generalisability 
Research results given by the instruments should be generalisable. They should 
represent the theory gathered and results produced. The theory is applicable to 
different settings not only for purposes of basic research, but also for purposes of 
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managing and solving problems that organisations like Transnet face in their daily 
operations (Chong, Techatassanasoontorn and Doolin, 2013). 
4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
All the required ethics forms were submitted to the Nelson Mandela University Ethics 
Committee for ethical clearance. The ethical principles listed below were followed: 
 Ethical Principles  
 Minimising harm.   
This research study is not likely to cause any harm to the individuals surveyed 
or interviewed. All the participants were free from any harm or danger 
whatsoever by taking part. The research is likely to be repeated by anyone 
without causing any harm.  
 Respecting autonomy.  
The research process showed respect for people in the sense of allowing them 
to make decisions for themselves, notably about whether or not to participate. 
The respondent knew that they could withdraw at any time from the process of 
the study. 
 Protecting privacy.  
When the research is to be made public, the respondents will be provided with 
descriptions and explanations of what would be publicly available. Also included 
would be what would not be made public. This will be to ensure that data is kept 
confidential. 
 Offering reciprocity.  
Researchers depend upon being allowed access to data, and this may involve 
people cooperating in various ways: for example, giving up time in order to be 
interviewed or to fill in a questionnaire. The research process can also disrupt 
people’s lives in various ways and to varying degrees when interviews are 
conducted. 
 Treating people equitably.  
It could be argued that the various individuals and groups that a researcher 
comes into contact with in the course of research would hold different positions 
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in the organisation. It was noted that should all be treated equally and the 
research study would promise such. This means that no-one would be unjustly 
preferred or separated against from the study (Montefiore, 2012). 
The treatment of the respondents is important to ensure that the study had followed 
proper protocols. No respondents was forced to take part if they were not willing. The 
researcher explained how the results would be distributed and published. This ensured 
that they will not be harmed in any way. Their reputation and equality was to be upheld 
at all times. 
4.8 SUMMARY  
 
Chapter 4 outlined how risk in Port MIS would be investigated. The research design 
clarified that the study would be a mixed method study using quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. The population and sample was identified. An overview of the 
research instruments and their application was provided. The chapter closed with a 
review of the ethics principles that were applied. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the data collected from Transnet. It focuses on the 
empirical data collected and discusses the findings. An analysis of the responses is 
given based on each of the research questions. The details surrounding each 
response and additional factors are discussed in the context of the research questions. 
 
5.2 DATA ANALYSIS BASED ON RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this study was to explore the effects of managing risk within 
Port Management Information Systems. It sought to do this through set research 
questions. 
 
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
RQ 1:  What are the risks that apply to information systems such as the Port MIS? 
RQ2:  What are prevalent risk assessment methods? 
RQ 3:  What are the effects of risk on Port MIS and subsystems? 
RQ 4:  What is the importance if risk assessments? 
RQ5:  What is the importance of risk management? 
RQ 6:  Do all eight ports in South Africa attach the same level of importance to risk     
           assessment for their Port MIS? 
RQ 7:  How can risk management strategy be standardised for all eight Ports? 
 
Together with the above research questions were sub-questions that related to the 
questionnaire, which the respondents had to answer. The analysis conducted on the 
data collected was a descriptive statistical analysis based on The Likert Scale. 
Respondents had to give an answer to each statement on the questionnaire ranging 
from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree.”   
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RQ1: What are the risks that apply to information systems such as the Port MIS? 
 
The first research question probed the risks to information systems such as the Port 
MIS.  
The questionnaire statements that addressed this research question were: 
 
 Information on systems are at risk of theft by employees. 
 Information on systems are at risk of theft by outsiders. 
 The computer equipment can be manually stolen from its physical location. 
 The system can easily be destroyed by intruders. 
 Employees of the organisation can damage the company’s information system 
internally by themselves. 
 Telecommunication and IT systems are at risk from the following attacks: Terror 
attacks e.g. such as inter-country warfare. 
 The telecommunication and IT system are at risk of the following attacks: 
Technological threats e.g. cyber-attacks. 
 The telecommunication and IT system are at risk of the following attacks: 
Criminal attacks such as phone lines being damaged. 
 The telecommunication and IT system are at risk of the following attacks: 
Criminal attacks such as cables being stolen. 
 
Table 5.1: Information on systems are at risk of theft by employees.  
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  21% 25% 29% 21% 4% 100% 
No. of Respondents  5 6 7 5 1 24 
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Figure 5.1: Information on systems are at risk of theft by employees. 
Table 5.1 clarifies that most of the respondents (29%) were neutral to the statement. 
The second most did agree (25%). It should be of concern that most respondents felt 
that the system was at risk of theft by employees. Thieves also come in the form of 
individuals who are ambitious leaders, with the intention of starting their own business, 
or collaborating with outside companies if possible. It is necessary to have measures 
in place to detect their suspicious activities. The respondent company could use threat 
detection approaches (Refer Chapter 2: Table 2.2) and implement them to detect 
malicious activities by employees to minimise risk. 
 
Table 5.2: Information on systems are at risk of theft by outsiders 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  4% 21% 29% 38% 8% 100% 
No. of Respondents  1 5 7 9 2 24 
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Figure 5.2: Information on systems are at risk of theft by outsiders 
Table 5.2 clarifies that most of the respondents (38%) disagreed with the statement 
that information systems are at risk of theft by outsiders. 8% strongly disagreed. The 
neutral respondents (29%), combined with the number of those who strongly agreed 
(4%) and agreed (21%) made up 54% of the users. This surpassed 46% of the users 
who disagreed (38%) and strongly disagreed (8%) - that the information on systems 
was at risk of theft by outsiders. This reveals that there might be a possible breach of 
security.  
Those users who disagreed (38%) and those who were neutral (29%) mean that there 
is a group of people who do not know whether or not the information on systems is at 
risk of theft by outsiders.  
There should be further investigation as to why there are only (8%) that disagrees and 
(38%) who strongly disagrees. What did the other users feel about theft? The threats 
by outsiders represent an example of threats by saboteurs who may be known to 
individuals or groups within the company. They are likely to cause interruptions on 
shared resources of a computer network. The port MIS system has to be protected 
from such threats. 
 
Table 5.3: The computer equipment can be manually stolen from its physical location. 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  17% 33% 25% 21% 4% 100% 
No. of Respondents  4 8 6 5 1 24 
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Figure 5.3: The computer equipment can be manually stolen from its physical location 
 
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3 show that the most number of respondents (33%) agree that 
the computer equipment can be manually stolen from their physical location. This 
means that most respondents believed that the location where the computer 
equipment was kept was not safe, but at risk of being broken into. Respondents that 
strongly agree formed 17%, and those who were neutral were 25%.  The definition of 
risk includes theft as an undesirable effect. Therefore, it can be concluded that there 
is a need to protect the computer equipment against physical theft. 
 
 
Table 5.4: The system can easily be destroyed by intruders 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  4% 21% 29% 34%% 12% 100% 
No. of Respondents  1 5 7 9 3 24 
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Figure 5.4: The system can easily be destroyed by intruders 
 
The most number of respondents (34%) disagreed. The above combination of those 
who are neutral (29%), agree (21%), strongly agree (4%), were respondents who 
seem to suggest that the system could be at risk of intruders easily destroying the 
systems. These threats are exogenous risks, which an organisation has no hold over, 
and are of activities not within the control of the organisation. There needs to be a 
system in place to protect against intruders. 
 
Table 5.5: Employees of the organisation can damage the company’s information system 
internally by themselves 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  8% 46% 21% 21% 4% 100% 
No. of Respondents  2 11 5 5 1 24 
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.  
Figure 5.5: Employees of the organisation can damage the company’s information system 
internally by themselves 
 
The respondents who make up 54% of the sample seem to agree or strongly agree 
that the system is at risk of employees of the organisation damaging the company’s 
information system by themselves. The most number of respondents (46%) agree with 
the statement. The neutral respondents are the same as those who disagree (21%) 
that there is such risk. This is a concern that more than half of the sample thinks the 
system is at risk of such threats.  
 
An individual who is a threat to the company’s information system is a Rager and a 
Saboteur. There needs to be detection or monitoring of email activities as the first step 
because they tend to use unacceptable language and threatening emails. 
 
Table 5.6:The telecommunication and IT system are at risk of the following attacks:Terror 
attacks e.g. inter-country warfare 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  17% 33% 17% 29%  4% 100% 
No. of Respondents  4 8 4 7 1 24 
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Figure 5.6: The telecommunication and IT system are at risk of the following attacks: Terror 
attacks eg such as inter-country warfare 
Figure 5.6 and Table 5.6 show the breakdown of the respondents. The highest number 
of responses is from the group of respondents that agreed (33%) that the system was 
at risk of terror attacks. The second most group of respondents had disagreed (29%). 
The least number of respondents had strongly disagreed (4%).   
The above responses show 50% of respondents strongly agree (33%) and agree 
(17%) that there are concerns regarding risk to telecommunication and IT systems of 
terror attacks. Those who strongly disagree (29%) and disagree (4%) are below (50%). 
The neutrals at 17% leave doubts as to where they stand. 
Terror attacks bring undesirable effects – they are problems caused by humans.  To 
this extent, they are equated to Human-made disasters. On the myths relating to 
recovery, Myth1 clearly states that plans cannot only be made for natural disasters. 
Thus, these kinds of disasters need to have incorporated plans. This extends to plans 
to replace employees should they lose their lives. 
 
Table 5.7:The telecommunication and IT system are at risk of the following attacks: 
Technological threats e.g. cyber-attacks. 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  29% 54% 4% 13%  100% 
No. of Respondents  7 13 1 3  24 
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Figure 5.7: The telecommunication and IT system are at risk of the following attacks: 
Technological threats e.g. cyber-attacks. 
 
The analysis of the response on technological threats seems to suggest a one sided 
bias with results that agree mostly than disagree with the statement. In Figure 5.7 
above, the highest group of respondents agreed (54%), followed by those who strongly 
agreed (29%). They made up the most number of respondents in the sample on this 
statement. There was only one respondent (4%) who was neutral to the statement, 
with the second lowest being from the group that did not agree (13%). There was no 
one who strongly disagreed that the system was at risk of cyber-attacks. These were 
also very similar responses when it came to the analysis of the threat of 
telecommunication cables and telephone lines. The analysis has shown that over 50% 
of respondents agree and strongly agree that the system is at risk of threats that could 
hamper the system negatively. 
 
Table 5.8: Criminal attacks, such as phone lines being damaged 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  8% 71% 8% 13%  100% 
No. of Respondents  2 17 2 3  24 
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    Figure 5.8: Criminal attacks, such as phone lines being damaged 
The group with the highest number are those that agree (71%) that the 
telecommunication and IT system are at risk of criminal attacks such as to phone lines 
being damaged. They are followed by the few that disagree (13%) and those who are 
neutral and strongly agree (8%). However, the above statistics show that the number 
of those who agree are aware of the risks. 
 
Table 5.9: Telecommunication and IT systems are at risk of the following attacks: Criminal 
attacks, such as cables being stolen. 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  8% 71% 8% 13%  100% 
No. of Respondents  2 17 2 3  24 
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Figure 5.9: The telecommunication and IT system are at risk of the following attacks:  Criminal 
attacks, such as cables being stolen 
There was no respondent that strongly disagreed. However, there was a tie on those 
who were neutral and strongly agree (8%). The group of respondents who agreed 
(71%) that the cable in the IT systems were at risk of being stolen were more than the 
strongly agree respondents (8%). They make up the majority that believe that there 
are risks of criminal attacks, such as cables being stolen.  
A mechanism is needed to support the system against all the threats that are related 
to Telecommunication and IT systems. These are attacks concentrated at the user’s 
computer or internet connection, rather than the person using the computer. They are 
focused on pharming and the intent is to cause a system reconfiguration attack. There 
needs to be measures in place to control and limit such activities.  
The telecommunication systems are used for the operational activities or the 
functioning of the Port MIS system. The systems are susceptible to such attacks and 
operational activities need to be guided by management procedures and governance 
policies. Defence mechanisms against such threats are needed. 
The above is the last paragraph based on RQ1.  
 
RQ2: What are prevalent risk assessment methods? 
 
The second research question related to the prevalent risk assessment methods on 
Port MIS.  
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The questionnaire statements that addressed this research question were: 
 There is a need for software that can automatically detect threats to the 
information system. 
 Risk assessment methods are beneficial. 
 Risk assessment methods help to minimise risks. 
 There is a real time protection on the systems against threat. 
 The system has protection against hackers. 
 Connected to the system are only authorised users. 
 Users are only limited to work on systems that affect their work. 
 Software updates are done automatically to reduce the risks of threats. 
 
Table 5.10: There is a need for software that can automatically detect threats to the information 
system 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  46 33% 17% 4%  100% 
No. of Respondents  11 8 4 1  24 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Employees of the organisation can damage the company’s information system 
internally by themselves 
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Most respondents strongly agreed (46%) that there was a need for software that can 
automatically detect threats to the information system. The group that agreed (33%) followed 
this. The neutral respondents were 17%, along with those who disagreed (4%). There was no 
respondent that disagreed with the statement. 
The above Figure 5.10 shows that the majority of respondents know that there is a 
need to detect threats to information systems. The few who do not know or disagree 
need to be aware of why IT software is needed to detect threats. It is software systems 
that detect threats to information. It is innovative software systems that are guarding 
against possible mischievous attacks from outsiders and insiders.  
 
Table 5.11: Risk assessment methods are beneficial 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  46% 50% 4%   100% 
No. of Respondents  11 12 1   24 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Risk assessment methods are beneficial 
 
The most number of respondents (50%) agree as the majority that it is beneficial to 
have risk assessment methods. Those who strongly agree are 46%. There are only 
(4%) respondents that are neutral. The response indicates that the respondents know 
the benefits of risk assessment and feel that they are beneficial too.  
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This analysis shows that the majority of respondents do believe that having risk 
methods is beneficial.  However, although needed, it is known that risk assessment as 
part of risk management is conducted by a person with the knowledge to assess. Risk 
also cannot be quantified. The method used needs to be qualitative, based on decision 
and instinct, which is based on the knowledge of the assessor.  
 
Table 5.12: Risk assessment methods help to minimise risks 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  46% 50% 4%   100% 
No. of Respondents  11 12 1   24 
 
 
    Figure 5.12: Risk assessment methods help minimise risks 
 
The above Figure 5.12 is identical to the previous one, which gives a short analysis 
that the respondents also believe that risk assessment methods are both beneficial 
and help to minimise risks. This is confirmed by the fact the number who agree are the 
majority. There is only one respondent that was neutral and none disagreed or strongly 
disagreed. 
 
It is known that organisations utilise risk based strategic assessment and planning 
techniques for security that is self-directed, such as an OCTAVE. This would mean 
that the organisation takes the initiative for setting its own self-directed organisational 
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security strategy. Self-directed means the organisation will take initiatives based on its 
individual needs and desires - of where it wants to be in its security detail and 
measures. 
 
Table 5.13: There is real time protection on the systems against threat 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  21% 50% 29%   100% 
No. of Respondents  5 12 7   24 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13:There is a real time protection on the systems against threat 
Figure 5.13 and Table 5.13 show that the most number of respondents agreed (50%) 
that the system has real time protection against threats. However, a few strongly 
agreed (21%) as compared to those who are neutral (29%). A positive is that there are 
no respondents that disagree or strong disagree. The other observation is that there 
is no strong belief by the majority of the respondents about the real time protection.  
 A combination of 71% agree to strongly agree, believing in the need for protection in 
real time. Having had a look at real threats, another specific real time threat could be 
a hacker. This showed that there is an understanding that the system needs to have 
the benefits of real time information.    
A methodology known as Near Real Time Statistical Asset Priority Driven (NRTSAPD) 
Risk Assessment methodology could be of advantage in measuring the number of 
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attacks on the system used for real time protection. This has elements that look into 
aspects and measures of probability, calculations of being attacked, number of 
incidents and impact on the business. This is a measuring method used to gauge the 
systems/software implementation against attacks.  
 
Table 5.14: There is real time protection on the systems against threat 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  25% 42 33%   100% 
No. of Respondents  6 10 8   24 
 
 
    Figure 5.14: There is a real time protection on the systems against threat 
 
The above shows that the statement that the system has real time protection is not 
understood in relation to hackers being real time threats. To analyse from an inside 
perspective on who could be a threat, there needs to be sophisticated software that 
will assist with real-time protection from individuals termed hackers. 
 
Table 5.15: Connected to the system are only authorised users 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  50% 42% 8%   100% 
No. of Respondents  12 10 2   24 
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Figure 5.15: Connected to the system are only authorised users 
 
The responses from the respondents are captured in Figure 5.15 and Table 
5.15.There is an interesting revelation from the results. The number of respondents to 
strongly agree was 50% on the statement. They surpass the number of those that 
agree (42%) with a few neutrals (8%). 
 
The majority of the respondents strongly agree and agree (92%) that connected to the 
system are only authorised users. There are only (8%) of users that are neutral to the 
statement. This shows that the only users who are connected to the system are 
authorised.  The next statement assessed what the connected users work on. This 
was to better assess that the authorised users could not alter other users’ systems 
intentionally.  
 
Port MIS systems has only authorised users using the system. However, there is a 
need to be wary of careless users that could cause the loss of Intellectual Property 
(IP). There could be thieves with such intentions.  
Table 5.16: Users are only limited to work on systems that affect their work 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  21% 71% 4%  4% 100% 
No. of Respondents  5 17 1  1 24 
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Figure 5.16: Users are only limited to work on systems that affect their work 
 
The results show that at most they agree (71%), followed by the respondents that 
strongly agree (21%), that users are only limited to work on systems that affect their 
work. No respondent has disagreed. However, there were two respondents each (4%) 
that were neutral and strongly agreed.  
 
It is safe to conclude that the majority agree and strongly agree that the systems have 
only users working on systems at work. However, a worry is that it was found with 
strong conviction that things are not all well with the majority. This could cause an 
alarm that there are careless users who disregard corporate IT policies, thus exposing 
the business to risk. There is a need to emphasise policies on the use of systems. 
 
This leads to the last statement relating to RQ2. The statement related to software 
working on threats that could affect the system.  
 
Table 5.17: Software updates are done automatically to reduce the risks of threats 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  38% 54% 4% 4%  100% 
No. of Respondents  9 13 1 1  24 
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Figure 5.17: Software updates are done automatically to reduce the risks of threats 
The results show that the respondents agree (54%) that software updates are 
automatically conducted to reduce the risk of threats. This is followed by the number 
of those strongly agree (38%) with the previously mentioned statement. There are only 
2 other respondents who both disagreed and were neutral on this (4%). There was no 
respondent that disagreed with the statement. This leaves the results with the majority 
of respondents agreeing and strongly agreeing that software updates are done 
automatically to reduce the risk of threats. This analysis shows there was software 
that does automatic updates. 
 
RQ3: What are the effects of risks to Port MIS and subsystems? 
The third research question probed the understanding of what are the effects of risks 
to Port MIS and subsystems on Port MIS.  
 
The questionnaire statements that addressed this research question were: 
 External Customers’ business with the organisation can be affected by the 
shutdown of the system. 
 Data loss affects my department and the organisation as a whole. 
 “Information system risks cause “poor system performance”. 
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Table 5.18: External Customers’ business with the organisation can be affected by the shutdown 
of the system.  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  46 32 8 8 4 100% 
No. of Respondents  11 8 2 2 1 24 
 
 
Figure 5.18: External Customers’ business with the organisation can be affected by the 
shutdown of the system 
 
The responses show that most respondents agree strongly (46%) that there were 
negative effects to external customers’ business should there be a shutdown of the 
system. This is followed by the agree statement (32%). There is a tie on the neutral 
and disagree statement (8%) each, with only (4%) that strongly disagree. The majority 
of respondents showed an understanding of the effects of what a system shutdown 
can do to affect business affairs of the external customers.   
 
This shows the importance of knowing of risk, as highlighted by Pak’s (2008) 
assessment model. The impact of customers affected by a systems’ shutdown or a 
security breach can have a large impact, thus it should be important to know when it 
happens. Managing risks help in securing business. 
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Table 5.19: Managing risks will help not to lose future or current business 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  54% 42%  4%  100% 
No. of Respondents  13 10  1  24 
 
 
Figure 5.19: Managing risks will help not to lose future or current business 
 
Figure 5.19 and Table 5.19 captured the responses relating to the statement on 
managing risks. The most number of respondents seem to strongly agree that 
reputation of managing risks precedes itself and helps not lose future or current 
business. Most respondents strongly agree (54%), followed by the number of 
respondents that agree (42%). There were no neutral or respondents that strongly 
disagree. There were only (4%) that disagreed that managing risks will help not to lose 
future or current business. Figure 5.18 above reveals that the majority of respondents 
strongly agree and agree that managing risks will help not to lose future or current 
business.  
 
RQ3 included what the effects of data loss are. The next statement analyses the 
effects of when data is lost. This relates to both the department and whole 
organisation. The management of risks helps not to lose future or current business. 
However, there could be data loss during the process that also needs consideration. 
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Table 5.20: Data loss affects my department and the organisation as a whole 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  58% 29% 8% 4%  100% 
No. of 
Respondents  
14 7 2 1  24 
 
 
Figure 5.20: Data loss affects my department and the organisation as whole 
 
Figure 5.20 and Table 5.20 have captured the responses on data loss. The most 
number of respondents seem to strongly agree (58%) that data loss has an effect on 
their departments and the entire organisation.  This is followed by half the number that 
agree (29%), with (8%) that are neutral and (4%) that disagree. There was no 
respondent that strongly disagreed.  
 
There is an overwhelming combination that strongly agreed and agree (88%) that data 
loss affects both their departments and organisation as a whole. Only a small number 
(12%) were neutral (8%) and disagreed (4%). There needs to be an understanding of 
different approaches and techniques to detect threats, as seen in Table 2.2. 
Table 5.21: Information system risks cause financial risks e.g. loss of income  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  42% 46% 4% 4% 4% 100% 
No. of Respondents  10 11 1 1 1 24 
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Figure 5.21: Information system risks cause financial risks e.g. loss of income etc. 
The next statement of analysis looks into the effects of risk. The responses relating to 
the statement are captured in Figure 5.21 and Table 5.21. The most number of 
respondents seem to agree (46%) that information system risks have financial 
implications. This is followed by respondents that strongly agree (42%).  4% of 
respondents were neutral, disagreed and strongly disagreed. The results suggest that 
the majority of respondents seem to agree and strongly agree that there are financial 
risks that are related to information risks.  
 
There are also risks relating to poor system performance. The respondents 
understood how risks affect the organisation. The effects, such as the financial risks, 
are the results.  
 
RQ3 included analysis on how risks cause poor system performance.  
Table 5.22: Information system risks cause poor system performance 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  25% 54% 17% 4%  100% 
No. of 
Respondents  
6 13 4 1  24 
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Figure 5.22: Information system risks cause poor system performance 
The results on how risks cause poor system performance are shown in Figure 5.22 
and Table 5.22. The most number of respondents seem to agree (54%) that 
information system risks cause poor system performance. This majority is followed by 
the number of respondents that strongly agree (25%). Respondents that are neutral 
were 17% and those that disagree were 4%. 
The majority strongly agreed (25%) and agreed (54%) that Information System (IS) 
risk causes poor system performance. The 21% that are neutral and disagreeing show 
that a small number were not aware and along those who disagreed (4%).  
This is the last statement relating to the RQ3 analysis.  
The above responses provide convincing evidence that there is an understanding of 
risks relating to the organisation’s business. This could relate to operational activities 
that are guided by management procedures and governance policies that define the 
defence mechanisms against threat. Their intention is to increase the level of defence 
on attacks or threats to IT resources. 
 
RQ4: What is the importance of risk assessment? 
 
The fourth research question probed the importance of risk assessments on Port MIS.  
 
The questionnaire statements that addressed this research question were: 
 “I am personally aware of threats that exist by being connected to the Internet”. 
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 “Employees have adequate risk awareness of the use of information systems”. 
 “The Company has regular risk assessments being conducted”. 
 
The next section focuses on the importance of risk assessment and, like the previous 
research question, the analysis is based on a number of statements relating to the 
research question. 
 
Table 5.23: I am personally aware of threats that exist by being connected to the Internet 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  25% 42% 17% 4% 12% 100% 
No. of Respondents  6 10 4 1 3 24 
 
 
Figure 5.23: I am personally aware of threats that exist by being connected to the Internet 
 
The first statement relating to RQ4 is on whether people are aware of threats relating 
to being connected to the internet. The results show that respondents in Figure 5.24 
and Table 5.24 agreed (42%) that they are aware of threats that exist by being 
connected to the internet. Respondents that strongly agree (25%) with the statement 
followed. Respondents that were neutral (17%) were followed by respondents that 
strongly disagreed (12%), with the least disagreeing (4%). 
 
These attacks are focused on the user’s computer or internet connections, not on the 
person using the computer. The focus is on pharming and the intent is to attack the 
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system reconfiguration. Telecommunication systems face such risks and the ideal 
would be to change the system’s configuration.  
Table 5.24: Employees have adequate risk awareness of the use of information systems 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  12% 46% 42%   100% 
No. of Respondents  3 11 10   24 
 
 
Figure 5.24: Employees have adequate risk awareness of the use of information systems   
 
The next statement assesses the awareness of employees to information system 
risks. The results are captured in Figure 5.24 and Table 5.24. The results of the 
previous statement and current statement are conflicting somehow. The analysis 
shows that most of the respondents agree (46%) that employees have adequate risk 
awareness of the use of information systems. It is significant that the second most 
respondents are now neutral. Previously the group that was neutral was the group that 
strongly agreed. 
 
The number of respondents that are neutral seem to have increased to 42%, as it was 
previously 17%. This has lowered from those who strongly agree with the statement 
that employees have adequate risk awareness of the use of information systems. 
None disagreed or strongly disagreed. The majority of those who agreed and strongly 
agreed has significantly gone down (13%). However, the neutrals went up (35%). It 
should cause alarm that awareness on the use of information system, when compared 
to the awareness on being on the internet, are not correlating.  
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This shows that a number of respondents are not aware of risk awareness strategies 
on the use of information systems. Clearly, risk awareness campaigns are not in place. 
This would also lead to query if the organisation does conduct regular risk 
assessments.  
 
Table 5.25: The company has regular risk assessments being conducted 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  25% 54% 13% 4% 4% 100% 
No. of Respondents  6 13 3 1 1 24 
 
 
 
Figure 5.25: The company has regular risk assessments being conducted 
The results on whether the company has regular risk assessments being conducted 
are on Figure 5.25 and Table 5.25. The results indicate that most respondents agree 
that the company has regular risk assessment being conducted. However, this result 
is quite alarming based on the inconsistency with the previous statement (Refer Table 
5.24).  
 
With a port being a high-risk organisation, it must not be assumed that users 
understand the purpose of IS assessments. Transnet is a high-risk organisation that 
conducts risk assessment on its operations. With caution exercised, the second most 
group was those that strongly agreed (25%) and the neutrals were lower (12%). The 
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two groups with similar results strongly disagree (4%) and disagree (4%). The two 
groups did not feature on the previous statement (Employees have adequate risk 
awareness of the use of information systems). This should cause alarm because users 
need to know more about risk assessments. 
 
The combination of those who strongly agree and agree (79%) with the statement 
seem to be higher than the previous statement (58%). The individuals who are neutral 
have dropped. The neutral respondents have dropped significantly (38%). This huge 
change should be not be taken at face value as an improvement. However, it could be 
an understanding that regular risks assessments are done because of the nature of 
the environment where the system is used. Assessments are done on the ports, but 
not on the system itself.  
 
Both need assessments to be done regularly. This is to mean that within the 
organisation, initiatives for setting the security strategy is lacking.  
 
RQ5: What is the importance of risk management? 
 
The fifth research question focused on the importance of risk management on Port 
MIS.  
The questionnaire statements that addressed this research question were: 
 Third parties handle risks to information systems at the same level as our 
organisation. 
 The organisation’s information system is protected from criminal elements by 
controlled access to them. 
 Risk awareness campaigns that help to minimise risk should be conducted. 
 Procedures help to minimise risk. 
 The system can easily recover from technical disasters e.g. internet downtime. 
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Table 5.26: Third parties handle risks to information systems at the same level as our 
organisation.  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  4% 38% 42 16%  100% 
No. of Respondents  1 9 10 4  24 
 
 
Figure 5.26:  
Third parties handle risks to information systems at the same level as our organisation. 
 
Figure 5.26 and Table 5.26 show the importance of risk assessment and enquiring 
how the third parties handle risk to information systems. Do they take precautions at 
the same level as the organisation? It was found that the most number of respondents 
were neutral (42%) to the statement. The second highest group of respondents agreed 
(38 %). The third highest group disagreed (17%) with the least group of respondent 
agree (4%).  There is no respondent that disagree. 
 
It is important to know that both internal and external parties handle risks at the same 
level in the organisation where they work. It is a known fact that in outsourcing, 
organisations collaborate with companies that can provide them with IT systems to 
help their own business. In return, companies offer them  incentives for taking the 
risks. These strategic partners are remunerated well and they need to match the 
organisation’s standards, if not better them. A company will need to collaborate with 
organisations that meet or exceeds their expected standards in handling threats. 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
Third parties handle risks to information systems 
at the same level as our organisation
86 
 
Table 5.27: The organisations’ information system is protected from criminal elements by 
controlled access to them. 
  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  33% 42% 25%   100% 
No. of Respondents  8 10 6   24 
 
 
Figure 5.27: The organisations’ information system is protected from criminal elements by 
controlled access to them 
 
The impact of criminal elements has been captured in Table 5.27 and Figure 5.27.The 
analysis shows that the most number (42%) of respondents agree with the statement. 
The next group (33%) strongly agrees and the last set of respondents (25%) were 
neutral. There were no respondents that disagreed and strongly disagreed. It is known 
that a significant number of organisations assign enormous funds for IT security, thus 
the employees feel that the systems are doing their best to filter criminal elements. 
Table 5.28: Testing recovery plans should be done routinely.  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  50% 50%    100% 
No. of Respondents  12 12    24 
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Figure 5.28: Testing recovery plans should be done routinely 
 
The results of the statement that testing recovery plans should be done routinely are 
captured in Figure 5.28 and Table 5.28. The analysis shows that half agree (50%) and 
strongly agree (50%). 
The analysis of the above shows that it is a one-sided choice – the respondents all 
agreed that testing the recovery plan should be done routinely. The above could be 
cause for alarm as it reveals that there is a need for testing of recovery plans to be 
done routinely. On system recovery, the myth is that any plan that has never been fully 
tested is useless – emphasising that the Port MIS recovery plan does need to be 
regularly tested.  The respondents agree with this. 
 
Table 5.29: Risk awareness campaigns to help minimise risks should be conducted 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  42% 58%    100% 
No. of Respondents  10 14    24 
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Figure 5.29 : Risk awareness campaign to help minimise risks should be conducted 
The results of the statement that risk awareness campaigns help to minimise risk are 
captured in Figure 5.29 and Table 5.29. Most of the respondents agreed with the 
statement that risk awareness campaigns help to minimise risks when conducted. 
There were no neutral, disagreeing and strongly disagreeing respondents. 
The combination of those who agree and strongly agree confirms that the respondents 
feel that risk awareness campaigns do help to minimise risks and should be 
conducted. However, the issue is that there is no strong conviction by a majority on 
the statement. This should be a concern as it confirms that there is a need to have risk 
awareness campaigns to help minimise risks. The same point was recognised on 
testing recovery plans. Risk awareness should entail knowing the disaster recovery 
sites as employees should not be found wanting during disasters.  
 
Table 5.30: Procedures help to minimise risks 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  46% 46% 8%   100% 
No. of Respondents  11 11 2   24 
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Figure 5.30: Procedures help to minimise risks 
The results of the statement that Procedures help to minimise risks were captured in 
Figure 5.30 and Table 5.30. The analysis shows that the same number of respondents 
chose strongly agree and agree (46%) that procedures help to minimise risks. The 
neutral group represented (8%). No respondents disagreed. 
The combination of respondents that were in favour of procedures to minimise risks 
was 92%. This is a combination of those who agree (46%) and strongly agree (46%). 
This shows that respondents understand that procedures really help to limit risks to 
information systems. Spremu (2012) in Chapter 2 mentioned that procedures for 
managing IT risks at business unit level or functional level should follow set standards 
and norms set by international regulatory bodies. The organisation would have to 
follow such standards to help to minimise risks. 
 
Table 5.31: The system can easily recover from man-made disasters such as fires.  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  17% 58% 21% 4%  100% 
No. of Respondents  4 14 5 1  24 
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Figure 5.31: The system can easily recover from man-made disasters such as fires 
With the procedures in place, another aspect to consider is unforeseen circumstances. 
The results for the statement that the system can easily recover from disasters are in 
Figure 5.31 and Table 5.31. The highest number of respondents agree (58%) that the 
system can easily recover from man-made disasters such as fires. The second most 
number (21%) of respondents seem to be neutral. The third most number (17%) of 
respondents strongly agree, with the last (4%) respondents disagreeing with the 
statement. There is no respondent that has strongly disagreed. 
 
There is a significant number of respondents that strongly agreed and agreed (75%) 
that the system can easily recover from man-made disasters, such as fires. The 
analysis showed that the majority of respondents agreed and strongly agreed that the 
system can recover from disasters.   
 
Table 5.32: The system can easily recover from man-made disasters such as vandalism. 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  17% 54% 17% 8% 4% 100% 
No. of Respondents  4 13 4 2 1 24 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
The system can easily recover from man-made 
disasters such as fires
91 
 
 
Figure 5.32: The system can easily recover from man-made disasters such as vandalism 
The results of the statement that the system can easily recover from man-made 
disasters such as vandalism was captured in Figure 5.32 and Table 5.32. Most 
respondents agree that the system can recover from vandalism. There is however, a 
difference between vandalism and fire recovery. The results are inconsistent although 
they are both man-made disasters. There is a drop in those who agreed from recovery 
of fires (63%) to those in vandalism (54%). 
The number of respondents that agreed and strongly agreed have declined (71%). 
The increase was noted on the combination of those who are neutral, disagree and 
with those who strongly disagree (29%).  
The results on the statement that the system can easily recover from technical 
disasters such as internet downtime was captured in Figure 5.33 and Table 5.33.The 
analysis shows that most of the respondents agree (63%) that the systems can easily 
recover from technical disasters. This is followed by the second most number of 
neutral respondents (25%).  
 
Table 5.33: The system can easily recover from technical disasters such as internet downtime 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  12% 63 25%   100% 
No. of Respondents  3 15 6   24 
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Figure 5.33: The system can easily recover from technical disasters such as internet downtime 
The number of respondents that agree (63%) and strongly agree (12%) made up  the 
most number of respondents. This result shows that the system can recover with ease 
from technical disasters. The concern is the number of those that are neutral (25%), 
meaning that they are not aware of what would happen in the case of technical 
disasters. Awareness of what to do when disaster strikes take into consideration that 
users need to be informed of what to do when risk awareness campaigns are 
conducted.  
 
Table 5.34: The system can easily recover from natural disasters such as floods and storms 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  12% 59% 17% 8% 4% 100% 
No. of Respondents  3 14 4 2 1 24 
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Figure 5.34: The system can easily recover from natural disasters such as floods and storms 
The results of the statement that the system can easily recover from natural disasters 
such floods and storms are shown in Figure 5.34 and Table 5.34. The results seem to 
have risen. The number of respondents that agree are 59%.  The second most 
respondents (17%) are neutral. Responses proved to be different to the previous 
statement. More respondents were neutral or disagreed. 
The analysis from technical disasters shows a decline in the number of those who both 
agree and strongly agree – when compared to the responses to technical disasters. 
The results might indicate that there is a concern worth noting relating to recovering 
from disaster. 
Management must note that recovery is a critical aspect to consider. On the system, 
recovery plans have been mentioned - that centrally coordinated planning for disaster 
recovery (DR) is a must. In addition, it was pointed out that the greater and more 
compound the business, the more empirical it becomes. There has to be a centralised 
process for all DR plans, so that each separate division or other entities are not 
duplicating the practice. Although these are independent disasters, they should be 
centrally coordinated. 
The disaster recovery planning has to cater for all kind of disasters. The management 
should also inform users that both natural and unnatural disasters carry the same risks 
for the business.  
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RQ 6: Do all eight ports in South Africa attach the same level of importance to 
risk assessment for their Port MIS? 
The sixth research question asked about the level of importance of risk management 
on Port MIS at each port.  
 
The questionnaire statements that addressed this research question were: 
 Risk assessment is continuously conducted on my department. 
 There are risk assessment standards on my department. 
 The organisation has the same risk assessment standards across all ports. 
 
Table 5.35: Risk assessment is continuously conducted on my department.  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  29% 38% 21% 12%  100% 
No. of Respondents  7 9 5 3  24 
 
 
 
Figure 5.35: Risk assessment is continuously conducted on my department 
This section is a discussion of the statements relating to understanding if all eight ports 
in SA attach the same level of importance to risk assessment for their Port MIS. The 
respondents’ responses were captured in Figure 5.35 and Table 5.35. 
38% of the respondents agree that risk assessment is continuously conducted in their 
departments. The second most number (29%) of respondents strongly agreed with the 
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statement. The third most number (21%) of respondents were neutral, with the least 
(12%) group disagreeing with the statement. There is no strong conviction on the 
agreement that departments have risk assessments done continuously. This could be 
alarming and needs managerial action. Risk assessments should be guidelines or 
standards that need to be in place.  
67% of respondents agreed and strongly agreed that risk assessments were done in 
their departments. Those that disagreed and were neutral showed that there is a 
possibility that IS Risk assessment is not continuously conducted in their departments. 
There should be a mandate ensuring that IS risk assessment is continuously 
conducted in all departments.  
Table 5.36: There are risk assessment standards in my department. 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  25% 67%  8%  100% 
No. of Respondents  6 16  2  24 
  
 
Figure 5.36: There are risk assessment standards in my department 
This statement probed if there were risk assessment standards in relation to 
departments that claim to have assessments conducted. The results of the statement 
are shown in Figure 5.36 and Table 5.36. 
The most number of respondents (67%) agreed that there are risk assessment 
standards in their departments. There are, however, inconsistencies with the previous 
results that probed if risk assessments are continuously conducted in departments. 
The respondents agreed (67%) compare to the previous (38%).  
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This reveals that there are risk assessment standards. However, they are not properly 
implemented. The second most respondents were those who strongly agreed (25%). 
There were 8% of respondents that disagreed, with none on neutral and strongly 
disagree. The respondents who agreed and strongly agreed made up over 50% of the 
results. However, they were not strong on conviction. They should apply OCTAVE, 
which is a methodology known to be better for self-directed teams as in departments. 
This would help to maintain standards that are internationally recognised, such as 
NRTSAPD, which is used to assess real time threats. 
 
The number of respondents that agreed and strongly agreed have gone up when 
compared to the previous statement: 67% from 29% of respondents. This highlights 
that there are standards, but they are not used in assessing the system risks or they 
could relate to other matters within the Transnet group. The respondents who were 
neutral have also diminished (to 0%), lower than the individuals that disagree. This is 
a contrast worth noting for remedial action and recommendations. This led to the last 
analysis statement for RQ6.  
 
The next statement encompassed all the ports.  
Table 5.37: The organisation has the same risk assessment standards across all ports 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  33% 46% 21%   100% 
No. of Respondents  8 11 5    24 
  
 
Figure 5.37: The organisation has the same risk assessment standards across all ports 
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The purpose of this next statement was to find out if there were consistencies in the 
way risk was managed in all ports. The results of the statement that the organisation 
had the same risk assessment standards across all ports is shown in Figure 5.37 and 
Table 5.37. 
 
The most number of respondents agreed (46%) that the organisation had the same 
risk assessment standards. The second most respondents also strongly agreed (33%) 
and the last group was neutral (21%). There were none that disagreed and strongly 
disagreed. There was inconsistency in the numbers of those that agreed and strongly 
agreed, with the new total being 79%, a slight decline from the 83% of the respondents. 
There is also growth of the neutrals, who moved up to 21% from none. This could 
imply that other respondents were not aware if the same standards were applied 
across all ports.  
RQ6 exposed huge discrepancies in how risk assessments are done, although 
standards were available and being applied across all ports. All ports did not have the 
same standards applied. The statements revealed that there are risk assessment 
done, but the use of the same standards is not a certainty. This means that 
standardisation is needed.      
 
RQ 7: How can a risk management strategy be standardised for all eight ports?   
The seventh research question asked how risk management strategies could be 
standardised for all eight Ports.   
 
The questionnaire statements that addressed this research question were: 
 It is ideal to have policy guidelines for Transnet employees for the use of 
information systems. 
 Disaster recovery plans are a “must-have" for Transnet operations. 
 Employees on the internet should be protected from online threats. 
 There should be an overall organisational strategy on Risk Management for 
Port MIS. 
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Table 5.38: It is ideal to have policy guidelines for Transnet employees for the use of information 
systems 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  67% 33%    100% 
No. of Respondents  16 8    24 
 
 
Figure 5.38: It is ideal to have policy guidelines for Transnet employees for the use of 
information systems 
The results of the statement that it was ideal to have policy guidelines for Transnet 
employees for the use of information systems is shown in Figure 5.38 and Table 
5.38.The results show that most respondents strongly agreed (67%) that it is ideal to 
have policy guidelines, with the second most group agreeing (33%) with the statement. 
There were no other responses on the statement. The finding was that respondents 
mostly strongly agreed that it was ideal to have policy guidelines for Transnet 
employees for the use of information systems. This aligns with the fact that the 
respondents had only chosen the option to agree and strongly agree. This reveals that 
there is a need for policy guidelines on the use of information systems. 
Organisations have numerous information security policies and procedures to protect 
themselves against risks. These policies are to decrease and prevent the planned or 
unintentional actions of staff that could deteriorate the efficiency of the hardware and/ 
or software protection systems. This would reduce their usefulness. Respondents 
clearly have a good understanding of what policies could do to help to manage risks 
relating to Port MIS. 
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Table 5.39: Recovery plans after disasters is a “must-have" for Transnet  Operations 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  63% 33% 4%   100% 
No. of Respondents  15 8 1   24 
 
 
Figure 5.39: Recovery plans from disasters is a “must-have" for Transnet operations 
The results for the statement that recovery plans after disasters was a “must-have" for 
Transnet operations is shown in Figure 5.39 and Table 5.39.The most number of 
respondents strongly agree (63%) that disaster recovery plans is a ‘must have’ for the 
organisation. The second most group also agrees (33%), but only to have one (4%) at 
neutral. This analysis shows that disaster recovery plans are necessary.  
 
Close to 100% of respondents agree and strongly agree that disaster recovery plans 
are necessary.  DR site planning and building should never be left for later as the 
system production time has the capability to draw on all the resources towards it. 
Delaying DR planning might end up with it failing to materialise. 
 
Table 5.40: Employees on the internet should be protected from online threats 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  75.% 25%    100% 
No. of Respondents  18 6    24 
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Figure 5.40: Employees on the internet should be protected from online threats 
The next statement analysed related to the management of risks exposure online. This 
is to understand if respondents were protected online. 
 
The responses to the statement that employees on the internet should be protected 
from online threats are shown in Figure 5.40 and Table 5.40. The results show that 
most respondents strongly agree (75%) that employees on the internet should be 
protected from online threats. The second most group of respondents agree (25%) 
with the statement.  
 
The results lean towards the suggestion that there is a need for employees on the 
internet be protected from online threats, as this is supported by all respondents. 
Companies tend to put in more money on sophisticated software to protect their 
employees online. It would be unwise to choose less expensive but weaker software 
to protect employees while they are online.  
 
Table 5.41: There should be an overall organisational strategy on Risk Management for Port MIS 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
% Respondents  46% 54%    100% 
No. of Respondents  11 13    24 
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Figure 5.41:There should be an overall organisational strategy on Risk Management to Port MIS 
The results of the statement that there should be an overall organisational strategy on 
Risk Management for Port MIS are shown in Figure 5.41 and Table 5.41. The most 
number of respondents (54%) agree that there should be an overall organisational 
strategy on Risk Management for Port MIS. The second most respondents agree 
strongly (46%).  
 
Hundred percent (100%) of respondents agree and strongly agree. This shows a 
strong conviction that respondents agree with the statement. This emphasises the 
importance of having an overall organisational strategy on Risk Management for Port 
MIS. 
 
The review on risk management of Port MIS showed that respondents agreed with 
strong conviction that policies on the use of the systems, protection on the internet 
and disaster recovery plans were all vitally needed. The real focus has been on the 
overall organisation strategy that encompasses all the ports. The respondents agreed, 
however, though not with strong conviction, that they do have an understanding of 
Risk Management on Port MIS. It can be concluded that the respondents feel that 
there is a need for an overall Risk Management on Port MIS strategy.   
 
The strategy should encompass most of the statements where the respondents are 
not strong on agreeing with the statements pertaining to the research objectives. 
Research objectives related to Risk Management of Port MIS. Thus, it had to have 
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respondents strongly agreeing with statements relating to them to show a level of 
understanding on how to manage risks.  
 
5.3 SUMMARY 
 
Chapter 5 discussed the findings based on the feedback from respondents. The 
respondents were from management and encompassed senior and mid-management 
personnel who are assumed to be working on the Port MIS system. These results 
confirmed the need for the Port MIS to be protected from risk.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 6 presents the recommendations on the data analysed in Chapter 5.The data 
was based on the survey conducted. This chapter summarises the quantitative study 
for each of the research questions (Refer Section 6.2) and draws up managerial 
recommendations based on the qualitative study. Limitations of the study and future 
implications are outlined. The conclusion looks at the major recommendations that 
emerged from this study. 
6.2 Recommendations Based on the Research Questions.  
The primary objective of this study was to explore the effect of managing risk within 
Port Management Information Systems.   
 
Each research question is presented and recommendations made based on the 
findings of this study.  
The Research Questions are listed below: 
 
RQ 1:  What are the risks that apply to information systems such as the Port MIS? 
RQ2:  What are prevalent risk assessment methods? 
RQ 3:  What are the effects of risk on Port MIS and subsystems? 
RQ 4:  What is the importance of risk assessment? 
RQ5:  What is the importance of risk management? 
RQ 6: Do all eight ports in South Africa attach the same level of importance to risk 
 assessment for their Port MIS? 
RQ 7:  How can a risk management strategy be standardised for all eight ports? 
 
RQ 1:What are the risks that apply to information systems such as the Port MIS? 
Port MIS is at risk of theft by employees.  
The recommendation is that the system gets protection from theft by putting more 
security around the computer equipment.  This would also prevent theft by outsiders, 
as the respondents were not strong on conviction that the system was safe from 
outside threats. The outsider threats included intruders. Internal protection is also 
104 
 
needed in the form of who gets to use computer equipment. Policy must be followed 
on who signs the agreements for this. 
 
Port MIS is at risk of attacks on its telecommunication systems eg. terror, cyber and 
on telephone lines.  
The recommendation is that protection is needed against physical threat and damage 
to telephone lines. Sophisticated software is needed to defend against cyber-attacks. 
A disaster recovery plan on how to recover from any form of attack should be in place. 
 
RQ2: What are prevalent risk assessment methods? 
Port MIS is at risk if it does not update its prevalent risk assessment methods. 
The recommendation is that the system needs software to be protected from insider 
and outsider threats. The respondents felt that it would be beneficial to have such 
software. Risk assessment methods such as OCTAVE are recommended. An 
OCTAVE is a self-directed method that helps in risk management. Another method 
that helps in real time is the NRTSAP, which calculates the probability of attacks. The 
respondents showed a level of understanding of who hackers are, and the prevalent 
system seems to be protected against them. The system has software updates done 
automatically, which will help to withstand new challenges. 
 
Port MIS is at risk if users do not abide by their job description. 
The officially connected users of the system are genuine, but they seem to have 
access to areas beyond their job description.  
The recommendation is that management needs to put guidelines in place as to who 
gets to access what in relation to their work and job description.  
 
RQ 3: What are the effects of risk on Port MIS and sub-systems? 
Port MIS is at risk of losing data through system shutdown. 
The respondents showed understanding that any system shutdown does affect their 
department and the business as a whole. Data loss is known to have a huge impact 
on the business. Information risks such as data loss can cause financial risks that lead 
to loss of income. The respondents agreed, but not all were strongly convicted on this 
point. 
The recommendation is that management must emphasise the importance of 
information system risks more.  
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RQ 4: What is the importance of risk assessment? 
Port MIS is at risk if users are not fully aware of the need for risk assessment. 
The respondents are aware of threats of being on the internet, and of the need for 
assessments.  The respondents feel that they have adequate awareness of the risks 
when using information systems. The respondents showed a need for more 
awareness as they were not convinced that this was of any real urgency. This was 
despite the fact that risk assessments were done regularly.  
 
The recommendation is that management needs to conduct more risk awareness 
campaigns. There has to be a review of risk assessments relating to IS systems. The 
respondents agreed that risk awareness campaigns help to minimise risks and should 
be conducted. The procedure will have to be on set standards and norms set by 
international regulatory bodies. 
 
Port MIS is at risk if disaster recovery plans are not in place. 
The analysis on recovery of the system from disasters that are natural, man-made, 
technical and others show that the system can recover. However, there were   
discrepancies when it came to understanding that such disasters do impact on the 
business, no matter what form they take.     
The recommendation is that disaster recovery (DR) has to be a centralised process 
for all DR plans. The disaster recovery planning has to cater for all kind of disasters. 
This has to be an important part of risk management. 
 
RQ 4: What is the importance of risk assessment? 
Port MIS is at risk if third parties they outsource do not handle risk as expected. 
The survey revealed that outsourced third parties did not handle risks in the same way 
as the company contract stated.  
The recommendation is that management has to collaborate more with organisations 
that meet or exceeds their expected standards when addressing risk. The outsourced 
company should handle threats in the same way as their organisation.  
 
RQ5: What is the importance of risk management? 
Port MIS is at risk if more is not done about threats from criminal elements. 
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The organisation’s information system is protected from criminal elements through 
controlled access, as confirmed by the respondents. Despite this, employees still feel 
vulnerable. 
The recommendation is that a review is necessary on efficiency of the controlled 
access despite the security measures already in place. 
 
RQ 6: Do all eight ports in South Africa attach the same level of importance to 
risk assessment for their Port MIS? 
Port MIS is at risk if all ports do not have the same standards of risk assessment. 
The respondents agreed that regular risk assessments are conducted, but they 
differed at each level and port. Risk assessment standards within their respective 
departments differed. The same standards were not maintained across the eight ports.  
 
The recommendation is that there should be guidelines or standards that need to be 
in place and performed consistently at all ports and in all relevant departments.  
 
RQ 7: How can a risk management strategy be standardised for all eight ports? 
Port MIS is at risk if no standardised strategy is applied at all eight ports. 
The respondents agreed that it is ideal to have policy guidelines for all Transnet 
employees on the use of information systems. This will regulate the use of information 
systems and counter threats that would put Port MIS at risk.   
 
Respondents felt that having DR plans should be urgent. DR sites, planning and 
building should not be left for later, as the system production time has the capability to 
draw all the resources towards it. Besides, the DR planning might fail to materialise. 
 
The respondents felt that they should get protection from internet risk as part of risk 
management strategy. The majority had strong convictions on this need. However, 
they agreed on, but did not feel that it was urgent to have an overall standardised 
strategy for Port MIS. 
 
The recommendation is that management must clarify Risk Management so that all 
have a better understanding of it. Risk management should be an organised method 
of handling insecurity through risk assessment, as well as devising plans to manage 
and mitigate risk using managerial resources. Strategies should include giving the risk 
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to a third party. All port employees should be made aware that risk includes security 
threats, threats to property value and threats that influence probability. They should 
note also the exposure of property to threats, threat influence on organisations and on 
prevailing security.  
  
It is recommended that all these factors should be part of a document that is given to 
employees to make them aware of Risk Management. They need to take responsibility 
for all Risk Management as well.  
6.3 Limitations of the Study  
The study has had its own limitations that need to be mentioned in order for the reader 
to understand the impediments on the journey towards completion.  
The following are the limitations of the study. 
 Literature on previous studies relating to Port MIS and its sub-systems is 
limited. Most are written in Asian languages. 
 The library resources at Nelson Mandela University and the search engines do 
not extensively cover studies relating to Port Management Information 
Systems. 
 There is no set standard questionnaire relating to RISK Management of Port 
MIS. 
 The questionnaire distribution was administered by Transnet, thus the sample 
selection population could not be controlled.  
 The approval for the questionnaire distribution took very long. Thus the first 
draft of the questionnaire had to be accepted without being tested. 
 The response turnaround time took long for questionnaires. 
However, despite the above limitations, the study was conducted. The questionnaire 
responses were accepted based on the respondents’ job title or department in which 
they worked. The questionnaire covered most of what the literature review covered. 
The responses received showed a fair level of understanding relating to the subject of 
the study. 
 
6.4 Future Implications  
Transnet will need to measure how effective their Risk Management is in relation to 
Port MIS and related sub-systems. The recommendations made should be heeded. 
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There will also be a need to assess how the awareness of risk is conducted, based on 
the study results. The other aspect that needs assessment is the understanding of the 
need for an Overall Risk Management Strategy. This will have to be aligned with 
international standards, procedures and policies.  
6.5 Research Gaps  
 
The identified gaps in the literature review included the fact that the sub-systems 
making up the Port MIS are not standardised. Sub-systems that make up the Port MIS 
are different and they are not integrated for universal use. The Port MIS system is 
popular, but has only one vendor, KLNET. The system has not been tested for risks, 
thus the study exposed some of its major characteristics. The sub-systems have also 
not been assessed for risks relating to them. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
Port MIS would be an effective administrative and management tool for port managers. 
It is recommended that this study be a starting point for management changes at South 
African ports, and that risk should in future be addressed with the urgency that it 
warrants. 
 
I 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abbes, S. (2015). Seaport Competitiveness : A comparative empirical analysis 
between North and West African countries using principal component analysis. 
International Journal of Transport Economics, (January). 
Agubor, C. K., & Chukwudebe, G. A. (2015). Security Challenges to 
Telecommunication Networks : An Overview of Threats and Preventive 
Strategies, 124–129. 
Al-mamary, Y. H., Shamsuddin, A., & Aziati, N. (2014). The Role of Different Types 
of Information Systems In Business Organizations : A Review. International 
Journal of Research(IJS), 1(7), 1279–1286. 
Al Mazari, A., Anjariny, A. H., Habib, S. A., & Nyakwende, E. (2016). Cyber 
Terrorism Taxonomies. International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism, 
6(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.4018/IJCWT.2016010101 
Alberts, C., & Stevens, J. (2003). Introduction to the OCTAVE ® Approach, (August). 
Alfayyadh, S. A. J. (2017). Development of the framework for a lean , energy efficient 
, and environmentally friendly port : Umm Qasr Port as a Case Study. World 
Maritime University. 
Aron, R., Clemons, E. K., & Reddi, S. (2005). Just Right Outsourcing : Understanding 
and Managing Risk Introduction : Objectives of this paper. International 
Conference on System Sciences, 22(2), 1–10. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2005.368 
ASH Centre for Democratic Governance and Innovation. (2011). The Sum is Greater 
than the Parts : Doubling Shared Prosperity in Indonesia Through Local and 
Global Integration. 
Baird, A. J. (2002). Privatization trends at the world’s top-100 container ports. 
Maritime Policy and Management, 29(3), 271–284. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03088830210132579 
Bernard. (2000). Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology. Sociological 
Research Online, 5(1), 183–186. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2000.102.1.183 
Bertino, E. (2012). Data Protection from Insider Threats. (M. T. Özsu, Ed.). Morgan & 
Claypool Publishers. https://doi.org/10.2200/S00431ED1V01Y201207DTM028 
Borrego, M., & Tech, V. (2009). Quantitative , Qualitative , and Mixed Research 
Methods in Engineering Education. Journal of Engineering Education, (August 
2016). https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2168-9830.2009.tb01005.x 
Cabezas, P. R., & Kasoulides, G. (2004). International Maritime Organization. The 
II 
 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 3(3), 235–245. 
https://doi.org/10.1163/187529988X00184 
Case, J. M., & Light, G. (2011). Emerging Methodologies in Engineering Education 
Research. Journal of Engineering Education, 100(1), 186–210. Retrieved from 
http://www.jee.org 
Cepolina, S., & Ghiara, H. (2013). New trends in port strategies. Emerging role for 
ICT infrastructures. Research in Transportation Business and Management, 8, 
195–205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rtbm.2013.07.001 
Chaudhry, J. A., Chaudhry, S. A., & Rittenhouse, R. G. (2016). Phishing attacks and 
defences. International Journal of Security and Its Applications, 10(1), 247–256. 
https://doi.org/10.14257/ijsia.2016.10.1.23 
Chong, J., Techatassanasoontorn, A., & Doolin, B. (2013). Exploring qualitative 
comparative analysis in IS Research. In The Pacific Asia Conference on 
Information Systems (PACIS). Retrieved from 
http://aut.researchgateway.ac.nz/handle/10292/5560 
Chou, D. C., & Chou, A. Y. (2009). Computer Standards & Interfaces Information 
systems outsourcing life cycle and risks analysis. Computer Standards & 
Interfaces, 31(5), 1036–1043. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2008.09.032 
Čišić, D., & Tijan, E. (2011). Information management in seaport clusters, 2, 371–
386. 
Cullinane, K., Song, D.-W., & Wang, T. F. (2003). Private Sector Participation in 
Asian Ports. Turkish Chamber of Shipping in Instanbul, 615(5), 177–194. 
Dellios, K., & Polemi, D. (2012). Maritime clouds for the European ports. In 
Proceedings of the 2012 16th Panhellenic Conference on Informatics, PCI 2012 
(pp. 422–426). https://doi.org/10.1109/PCi.2012.39 
Department of Transport. (2009). Arrival of Ships to a Port - Port Regulations Guide 
to Ports Entry. 
Ekelhart, A., Fenz, S., & Neubauer, T. (2009). AURUM : A Framework for Information 
Security Risk Management, (September 2008), 1–10. 
Fernández, P., Santana, J. M., Ortega, S., Trujillo, A., Suárez, J. P., Domínguez, C., 
… Sánchez, A. (2016). Smartport: A platform for sensor data monitoring in a 
seaport based on FIWARE. Sensors (Switzerland), 16(3), 1–24. 
https://doi.org/10.3390/s16030417 
Gidado, U. (2015). Consequences of Port Congestion on Logistics and Supply Chain 
in African Ports. Developing Country Studies, 5(6), 160–168. Retrieved from 
III 
 
http://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/DCS/article/download/20933/21177 
Gleim, S. W. (2009). CANADA’S GRAIN HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEM: A GIS-BASED EVALUATION OF POLICY CHANGES. University of 
Saskatchewan Saskatoon. 
Goldberg, H. G., Young, W. T., Reardon, M. G., Phillips, B. J., & Senator, T. E. 
(2017). Insider Threat Detection in PRODIGAL. Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences, 2648–2657. 
https://doi.org/http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41476 
Gonzalez, R., Gasco, J., & Llopis, J. (2006). Information systems outsourcing : A 
literature analysis, 43, 821–834. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2006.07.002 
Goodhope, O., & Polytechnic, R. S. (2014). The Role of Effective Ports Management 
in Facilitating International Trade in Nigeria, 6(13), 204–215. 
Govender, N., & Mbhele, T. P. (2014). Dynamics of intermodal logistical systems on 
containerisation and road transportation in Durban, South Africa. Journal of 
Transport and Supply Chain Management, 8(1), 1–10. 
https://doi.org/10.4102/jtscm.v8i1.150 
Hagan, T. L. (2014). Measurements in quantitative research: How to select and 
report on research instruments. Oncology Nursing Forum, 41(4), 431–433. 
https://doi.org/10.1188/14.ONF.431-433 
Han, C.-R., & McGauran, R. (2014). Tracing trails: implications of tax information 
exchange programs for customs administrations. World Customs Journal, 8(2), 
3–14. https://doi.org/10.1093/annonc/mdm364 
Hathaway, O. A., Crootof, R., Levitz, P., Nix, H., Nowlan, A., Perdue, W., & Spiegel, 
J. (2012). The law of cyber-attack. California Law Review, 100(4), 817–885. 
https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38CR6N 
Herdzik, J. (2012). Possibilities of improving safety and reliability of ship propulsion 
system during DP operations, 19(2). 
Höst, M., & Lindholm, C. (2007). Different Conceptions in Software Project Risk 
Assessment, 1422–1426. 
Hu, Q., Dinev, T., Hart, P., & Cooke, D. (2012). Managing Employee Compliance 
with Information Security Policies : The Critical Role of Top Management and 
Organizational Culture, 43(4), 615–659. 
Ibrahimi, K. (2009). Performance Indicators and Port Authority Management. 5th 
International Conference of ASECU “Market Functionality and Institutional 
Reforms,” (May). https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.2806.9840 
IV 
 
Ignify. (2016). Software Solutions for Sea Ports, Ocean Shippers & Marine 
Terminals. Retrieved from 
http://www.ignify.com/port_billing_vessel_movement_management_software_so
lutions.asp 
Irvine, A., Drew, P., & Sainsbury, R. (2013). ‘ Am I not answering your questions 
properly ?’ Clarification , adequacy and responsiveness in semi-structured 
telephone and face-to-face interviews. Retrieved from 
http://qrj.sagepub.com/content/13/1/87.refs 
Jackson, L. A. (2008). Economic Acceptable Risk Assessment Model, 36–39. 
Karabacak, B., & Sogukpinar, I. (2005). ISRAM : Information security risk analysis 
method ISRAM : information security risk analysis method, (May 2016). 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2004.07.004 
Karahalios, H. (2014). The contribution of risk management in ship management : 
The case of ship collision. Safety Science, 63, 104–114. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2013.11.004 
Keceli, Y., Choi, H., Cha, Y., Aydogdu, Y. V., & Kim, H. (2008). PORT-MIS. Entruy 
Journal of Information Technology, 7(2), 165–175. 
Kim, S. Y. (2013). Korea Logistics Information systems applied Neal-Net 
Cooperation Mechanism. 
Kimberlin, C. L., & Winterstein, A. G. (2008). Validity and reliability of measurement 
instruments used in research. American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy, 
65(23), 2276–2284. https://doi.org/10.2146/ajhp070364 
Kitagaki, I., & Hikita, A. (2007). Development of an algorithm for groupware modeling 
for collaborative learning. International Journal of Computers, Communications 
& Control, 1. Retrieved from 
http://www.journal.univagora.ro/download/pdf/72.pdf 
Kleinport. (2016). KleinPort PMIS Maximizing operational efficiency. Burnaby: SAAB. 
Retrieved from www.kleinsystems.com 
Klopott, M. (2013). Restructuring of environmental management in Baltic ports: case 
of Poland. Maritime Policy & Management, 40(5), 439–450. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2013.798440 
KOSDAQ ( Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation ). (2015). Terminal & Port 
Solution. Korea Logistic Network CORP. 
Kumar, R., & Singh, H. (2015). A Proactive Procedure to Mitigate the BYOD Risks 
on the Security of an Information System. ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering 
V 
 
Notes, 40(1). https://doi.org/10.1145/2693208.2693231 
Landry, B. J. L., & Koger, M. S. (2006). Dispelling 10 common disaster recovery 
myths. Journal on Educational Resources in Computing, 6(4), 6–es. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1248453.1248459 
Laudon, K. C., & Laudon, J. P. (2010). Management In formation Systems : 
Managing the digital firm (11th ed.). London: Pearson. 
Lisle, J. De. (2011). The Benefits and Challenges of Mixing Methods and 
Methodologies: Lessons Learnt From Implementing Qualitatively Led Mixed 
Methods Research Designs in Trinidad and Tobago The Emergence of Mixed 
Methods Research. Caribean Curriculum, 18, 87–120. 
Lo, C., & Chen, W. (2012). Expert Systems with Applications A hybrid information 
security risk assessment procedure considering interdependences between 
controls. Expert Systems With Applications, 39(1), 247–257. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2011.07.015 
Majchrzak, A., & Markus, M. . (n.d.). Technology affordances and constraints. 
Encyclopedia of Management Theory. 
Marsh. (2014). Risk Challenges and Solutions Ports and Terminals. 
Mitra, C. C., & Borza, A. (2015). Research methodology – a quality assurance 
instrument . Analysis of internationalized masters of Babeș-Bolyai University. 
Review of Economic Studies and Research Virgil Madgearu, 1, 37–50. 
Montefiore, A. (2012). Ethics and Educational Policy. Review of Education, 
Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 6, 167–185. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0098559800060206 
Moore, A. P., Cappelli, D. M., Caron, T. C., Shaw, E., Spooner, D., & Trzeciak, R. F. 
(2011). A preliminary model of insider theft of intellectual property. Journal of 
Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable 
Applications, 2(1), 28–49. Retrieved from 
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-
84855181760&partnerID=tZOtx3y1 
Muijs, D. (2005). Doing quantitative research in education with SPSS. Measurement 
(Vol. 27). https://doi.org/10.7748/ns2013.06.27.43.59.s52 
Nehari Talet, A., Mat-Zin, R., & Houari, M. (2014). Risk Management and Information 
Technology Projects. International Journal of Digital Information and Wireless 
Communications, 4(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.17781/P001078 
Notteboom, T. E., & Rodrigue, J.-P. (2005). Port regionalization: towards a new 
VI 
 
phase in port development. Maritime Policy & Management, 32(3), 297–313. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03088830500139885 
Ntouskas, T., & Polemi, N. (2010). S-PORT : “ A secure , collaborative environment 
for the security management of Port Information Systems .” 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIW.2010.62 
O’Reilly, M., & Parker, N. (2012). “Unsatisfactory Saturation”: a critical exploration of 
the notion of saturated sample sizes in qualitative research. Qualitative 
Research, 13, 190–197. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794112446106 
Ojadi, F., & Walters, J. (2015). Critical factors that impact on the efficiency of the 
Lagos seaports. Journal of Transport and Supply Chain Management, 9(1), 1–
13. https://doi.org/10.4102/jtscm.v9i1.180 
Oregon State University. (1981). Ocean Transportation Serving Pacific Northwest 
Agriculture. 
Osei-Bryson, K. M., & Ngwenyama, O. K. (2006). Managing risks in information 
systems outsourcing: An approach to analyzing outsourcing risks and 
structuring incentive contracts. European Journal of Operational Research, 
174(1), 245–264. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2005.01.060 
Oxford University. (2016a). Management. Retrieved May 5, 2015, from 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/management 
Oxford University. (2016b). Title Risk. Retrieved May 5, 2015, from 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/risk?q=risk 
Oz, E. (2009). Management Information Systems. (K. Hennessy, D. Kaufmann, & A. 
Poirier, Eds.) (6th ed.). Cengage course Technology. 
Pak, C. (2008). The Near Real Time Statistical Asset Priority Driven ( NRTSAPD ) 
Risk Assessment Methodology, (443), 105–112. 
Park, N. K., Choi, H. R., Lee, C. S., Kang, M. H., Yang, J. W., Management, D., … 
E-mail, K. (2005). Port Management Information Systems towards privatazation, 
1–13. 
Pudhota, L. (2012). Collaborative Workflow Modelling Based on Activity Diagrams , 
Coloured Petri-nets and System Dynamics Table of Contents, (January). 
Rajnoha, R., Kádárová, J., Sujová, A., & Kádár, G. (2014). Business Information 
Systems: Research Study and Methodological Proposals for ERP 
Implementation Process Improvement. Procedia - Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, 109, 165–170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.12.438 
Raymond, D. R., & Midkiff, S. F. (2008). Denial-of-service in wireless sensor 
VII 
 
networks: Attacks and defenses. IEEE Pervasive Computing, 7(1), 74–81. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/MPRV.2008.6 
Ritchie, J., & Lewis, J. (2014). Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social 
Science Students and Researchers. Qualitative Research. London: Sage 
publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452230108 
Rødseth, Ø. J., Marinteknisk, N., & As, F. (2013). Secure Communication for E-
Navigation and Remote Control of Unmanned Ships. 
Rolland, E., Ulmer, J. R., & Patterson, R. A. (2014). Risk Mitigation Decisions for IT 
Security, 5(1). 
Romers, I. I. . (2013). Port Call Optimization in three oil shipping markets. Erasmus 
Universiteit Rotterdam. 
Rowbotham, J. M. (2014). Introduction To Marine Cargo Management. (P. J. 
McArthur, Ed.) (second edi). New York: Informa Law from Routledge. 
Samson, G. L. (2015). Securing an Information Systems from Threats : A Critical 
Review, 4(6), 425–434. 
Scupola, A. (2012). ICT Adoption in Facilities Management Supply Chain: The Case 
of Denmark. Journal of Global Information Technology Management, 15(1), 53–
78. https://doi.org/10.1080/1097198X.2012.10845612 
Seidtnan, I. (2006). Interviewing as Q.ualitative Research (3rd ed.). New York and 
London: Teacher College Press. 
Senator, T. E., Henry, G., Bader, D. A., Chow, E., Dietterich, T. G., Memory, A., … 
Koutra, D. (2013). Detecting Insider Threats in a Real Corporate Database of 
Computer Usage Activity. KDD’13. 
Serpella, A. F., Ferrada, X., Howard, R., & Rubio, L. (2014). Risk Management in 
Construction Projects: A Knowledge-based Approach. Procedia - Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, 119, 653–662. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.03.073 
Shang, K.-C., Chao, C.-C., & Lirn, T.-C. (2016). The application of personality traits 
model on the freight forwarding service industry. Maritime Business Review, 
1(3), 231–252. https://doi.org/10.1108/MABR-09-2016-0021 
Sherer, S. A. (2004). Managing Risk beyond the Control of IS Managers : The Role 
of Business Management, 00(C), 1–10. 
Spremiü, M. (2012). Corporate IT Risk Management Model : a Holistic view at 
Managing Information System Security Risks, 299–304. 
https://doi.org/10.2498/iti.2012.0461 
VIII 
 
Strandenes, S. P., & Marlow, P. B. (2000). PORT PRICING AND 
COMPETITIVENESS IN SHORT SEA SHIPPING. International Journal of 
Transport Economics, 27(3), 315–334. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42747574 
Tohidi, H. (2011). The role of risk management in IT systems of organizations. In 
Procedia Computer Science (Vol. 3, pp. 881–887). Elsevier. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2010.12.144 
UNCTAD. (2014). Review of maritime transport 2013. United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. https://doi.org/10.18356/d6798fb6-en 
Veith, H. M. (2015). Teaching resources , autonomy , and novel skills for 
independence and transitions ( T . R . A . N . S . I . T .) life skills program : a 
program development plan. Retrieved from http://utdr.utoledo.edu/graduate-
projects 
Venkatesh, V., & Brown, S. A. (2013). Research article bridging the qualitative- 
quantitative divide : Guidelines for conducting mix methos. MIS Quarterly, 37(1), 
21–54. 
Vukić, L., Peronja, I., & Slišković, M. (2018). Port pricing in the north port of split: A 
comparative analysis. Transactions on Maritime Science, 7(1), 59–70. 
https://doi.org/10.7225/toms.v07.n01.006 
Vuong, J. (2015). Disaster recovery planning, (October), 1–3. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/MP.2004.1301248 
Wegner, T. (2007). Applied Business Statistics : Methods and Excel based 
applications (2nd Editio). Juta. 
Wiesche, M., Keskinov, H., Scherman, M., & Kremar, H. (2013). Classifying 
Information Systems Risks : What Have We Learned So Far ? Chair for 
Information Systems. 46th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, 5013–5022. https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2013.130 
Wu, H., Chen, X., Hu, Q., Shi, C., & Mo, J. (2012). Novel Design of Inland Shipping 
Management Information System Based on WSN and Internet-of-things, 6(3), 
307–313. 
Xu, D., Li, C., & Leung, J. Y. (2012). Berth allocation with time-dependent physical 
limitations on vessels. European Journal of Operational Research, 216(1), 47–
56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.07.012 
Yilmaz, K. (2013). Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Traditions : 
epistemological , theoretical ,. European Journal of Education, 48(2). 
IX 
 
Zeadally, S., Yu, B., Jeong, D. H., & Liang, L. (2012). Detecting insider threats 
solutions and trends. Information Security Journal, 21(4), 183–192. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19393555.2011.654318 
Zhang, Z., & Xu, X. (2017). Principal agent model based design and outsourcing of 
information value. Cluster Computing, 20(1), 67–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-016-0724-0 
Zohrabi, M. (2013). Mixed Method Research: Instruments, Validity, Reliability and 
Reporting Findings. Theory and Practice in Language Studies, 3(2), 254–262. 
https://doi.org/10.4304/tpls.3.2.254-262 
  
X 
 
Appendix A  
Ethics clearance  
NELSON MANDELA 
U N I V E R S I TY 
ETHICS CLEARANCE FOR TREATISES/DISSERTATIONS/THESES 
Please type or complete in black ink 
FACULTY: Economic Sciences 
 
SCHOOUDEPARTMENT: Business School 
 
l, (surname and initials of supervisor) 
 
the supervisor for (surname and initials of candidate)Jafta N 
 
(student number) 205045928 
 
a candidate for the degree of Masters Business Administration 
 
with a treatise/dissertation/thesis entitled (full title of treatise/dissertation/thesis): 
Risk Management of Port Management Information 
Systems considered the following ethics criteria (please tick the 
appropriate block): 
 YES NO 
1. Is there any risk of harm, embarrassment of offence, 
however slight or temporary, to the participant, third 
parties or to the communities at lar e? 
 x 
FORM E 
XI 
 
2. Is the study based on a research population defined as 
'vulnerable' in terms of age, physical characteristics and/or 
disease status? 
 x 
2.1 Are subjects/participants/respondents of your study: 
(a) Children under the age of 18? 
(b) NMMU staff? 
(c) NMMU students? 
(d) The elderly/persons over the age of 60? 
(e) A sample from an institution (e.g. hospital/school)? 
 x 
 x 
 x 
 x 
 x 
 x 
Handica ed e. . mentall or h icall  ?  x 
3. Does the data that will be collected require consent of an institutional 
authority for this study? (An institutional authority refers to an 
organisation that is established by government to protect vulnerable 
eo le 
 x 
3.1 Are you intending to access participant data from an existing, stored 
re ositor e. . school, institutional or universi records ? 
 x 
4. Will the participant's privacy, anonymity or confidentiality be com 
romised? 
 x 
4.1 Are you administering a questionnaire/survey that: 
(a) Collects sensitive/identifiable data from participants? 
(b) Does not guarantee the anonymity of the participant? 
(c) Does not guarantee the confidentiality of the participant and the 
data? 
(d) Will offer an incentive to respondents to participate, i.e. a lucky 
draw or any other prize? 
(e) Will create doubt whether sample control measures are in place? 
(f) Will be distributed electronically via email (and requesting an email 
response)? 
Note: 
• If your questionnaire DOES NOT request respondents' 
identification, is distributed electronically and you request 
respondents to return it manually (print out and deliver/mail); 
AND respondent anonymity can be guaranteed, your answer will 
be NO. 
• If your questionnaire DOES NOT request respondents' 
identification, is distributed via an email link and works through 
a web response system (e.g. the university survey system); AND 
respondent anonymity can be guaranteed, your answer will be 
NO. 
 x 
 x 
 x 
 x 
 x 
 x 
 x 
XII 
 
Please note that if ANY of the questions above have been answered in the affirmative 
(YES) the student will need to complete the full ethics clearance form (REC-H 
application) and submit it with the relevant documentation to the Faculty RECH 
(Ethics) representative. 
and hereby certify that the student has given his/her research ethical consideration and full 
ethics approval is not required. 
 26/4/201 
SUPERVISOR(S) DATE 
DATE 
26/04/2018 
STUDENT(S) DATE 
Student(s) contact details (e.g. telephone number and email address): 
0815615997 and s205045928@mandela.ac.za 
 
Please ensure that the research methodology section from the proposal is attached to this form.
 
 
HE  OF DEPARTMENT 
XIII 
 
Appendix B 
Questionnaire 
 
Risk Management of Port MIS 
* Required 
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1HO9YF2sum0YDCqZV1uY-M2rSQ08AGVnarxj0miT3To4/edit?uiv=0 11/ 
1. To what extent do you agree with the following statement pertaining to Risk 
Management of Port Management Information Systems? *  
 
Strongly 
Disagree  Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree agree    
There should be an overall  
organisational strategy on Risk 
Management to Port MIS.  
Data loss affects my  
department and the  
organisation as whole  
Third parties handle risks to  
information systems the same  
level as our organisation  
Employees on the internet  
should be protected from online  
threats  
There are risk assessment  
standards on my department  
The company has regular risk  
assessments being conducted  
Testing recovery plan should be  
done routinely  
Information on systems are at  
risk of theft by outsiders  
Risk assessment methods are  
beneficial  
The organisation has the same  
risk assessment standards  
across all ports  
Risk awareness campaign help  
minimise risks should be  
conducted  
The system has protection  
against hackers  
There are easily accessible  
procedures on how to use the  
company’s information system  
Managing risks will help not to  
lose future or current business  
The system can easily be  
destroyed by intruders  
I am personally aware of threats  
that exist by being connected to  
the Internet  
Risk assessment is  
continuously conducted on my  
department  
Connected to the system are  
only authorised users  
The organisations’ information 
system is protected to criminal  
elements by controlled access  
XIV 
 
to them  
Employees of the organisation 
can damage the company’s  
information system internally by  
themselves.  
Risk assessment methods help  
minimise risks  
The systems is only used by  
authorised personnel  
Employees have adequate risk  
awareness of the use of  
information systems  
External Customers’ business  
with the organisation can be  
affected by the shutdown of the  
system  
There is a need for software 
that can automatically detect  
threats to the information  
system  
It is ideal to have policy 
guidelines for Tansnet  
employees for the use of  
information systems.  
There is a real time protection  
on the systems against threat  
Disaster recovery plans from  
disasters is a “must-have" for  
Transnet operations  
Software updates are done  
automatically to reduce the risks  
of threats  
Information on systems are at  
risk of theft by employees  
The computer equipment can  
be manually stolen from its  
physical location.  
Users are only limited to work  
on systems that affect their  
work  
Procedures help minimise risks 
 
2. Please indicate which of the following system(s) you work on 
? * Check all that apply. 
 
Facilities Management  
 
Billing Management  
 
Report/Statistics  
 
Vessel Management  
 
Cargo Management System  
 
Other:  
 
 
3. Please indicate the level of management within the 
organization Mark only one oval. 
 
Non-supervisory staff  
 
Junior Management 
 
Middle management  
 
Senior Management 
 
Other:  
XV 
 
  
 
4. Please indicate the port you are based 
at Mark only one oval. 
  
Ngqura 
 
Port Elizabeth  
 
Richards Bay 
 
Saldanha Bay  
 
Durban 
 
Cape Town  
 
Mossel Bay 
 
East London  
 
Other:  
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statement 
pertaining to Risk Management of Port Management 
Information Systems? 
 
5. Information system risks cause 
* Mark only one oval per row. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree  Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Agree    
financial risks e.g. such as loss  
of income etc.  
poor system performance 
 
6. The system can easily recover from disaster such 
as: * Mark only one oval per row. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree  Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Agree    
Man-made disasters such as  
fires  
Man-made disasters such as  
vandalism  
Technical disasters e.g. internet  
downtime  
Natural disasters e.g. floods,  
storms  
 
7. The telecommunication and IT system are at risk of the following 
attacks: * Mark only one oval per row. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree  Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Agree    
Terror attacks e.g. such as  
inter-country warfare  
Technological threats e.g. cyber  
attacks  
Criminal attacks such as phone  
lines being damaged  
Criminal attacks such as cables  
being stolen  
XVI 
 
 
Appendix C 
Permission to Submit 
 
  
XVII 
 
Appendix D 
Turnitin Report 
 
